

**FORMALISING THE INFORMAL: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE
STREET VENDING RELOCATION POLICY IN MALAWI**

MASTER OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT THESIS

MAPOPA MOYO

UNIVERSITY OF MALAWI

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MASTER OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT THESIS

By

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DECLARATION

This thesis is my original work and it has not been submitted to any other institution for similar purposes. Acknowledgements have been duly made where other people's work has been used. I bear the responsibility for the contents of this paper.

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CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this to my mother, Lonely Moyo, and to the memory of my father, Collins Mapopa Moyo.

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ABSTRACT

The study aimed to analyse the effectiveness of the street vending relocation policy in Malawi. Specifically, the study examined the extent to which the Lilongwe city council (LCC) effectively implements the street vending relocation policy. The study also explored street vendors' views and reactions towards the government's relocation policy. The study collected and analysed data from three key informant interviews, four focus group discussions with street vendors, and 384 questionnaires administered to street vendors. It used a mixed methods (qualitative and quantitative) approach. The data was analysed using content analysis and Statistical Package for Social Sciences. The study established that street vending persists, and the relocation policy is not effective despite the LCC's efforts to relocate street vendors. The study found that several factors affect the effectiveness of the local authorities, including political interference, which tends to stop the implementation of the policy. The lack of formal market infrastructure, unavailability of resources, and the lack of street vendors' representatives also limits the effectiveness of the LCC in relocating street vendors. The study also found that most of the street vendors do not consider relocation to formal markets beneficial. Therefore, the study confirms the notions of the dualist and the voluntarist theories that the formalisation of street vending can be effective when it limits informality and provides more benefits of formality, respectively.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

FGD	Focus Group Discussion
HSVU	Hsinchu Street Vendors' Union
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
KCCA	Kampala Capital City Authority
LCA	Lilongwe City Assembly
LCC	Lilongwe City Council
MUFIS	Malawi Union for Informal Sector
SAPs	Structural Adjustment Programmes
SPSS	Statistical Package for Social Sciences
SSI	Semi-Structured Interview
USD	United States Dollar
WIEGO	Women in Informal Employment: Globalising and Organising

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION AND STUDY BACKGROUND

1.1 Introduction

This thesis focused on analysing the effectiveness of regulating street vending in an African context. In particular, it analysed the effectiveness of the street vending relocation policy in Malawi. Street vending is an activity where individuals offer goods and services for sale roadside (Amoah-Mensah, 2016) without having a permanent built-up structure (Bhowmik, 2005) and without appropriate business permits (Cross, 1998). It is an informal activity as it operates outside formal regulation. According to Chen (2012), the informal economy comprises all forms of informal employment, which is employment outside formal regulatory arrangements, either in law or in practice. Informal economic activities, including waste picking, domestic work, construction work and street vending, often are an opportunity for jobs and income generation in many parts of the world (Chen, Roever, and Skinner, 2016), and more prevalent in African countries. Over 60% of the world's employed population earn their livelihoods in the informal economy (ILO, 2018). In Sub-Saharan Africa, the informal economy is the main source of employment (Brown, Lyons, and Dankoco, 2010) as it accounts for 89.2% of all employment (ILO, 2018). Street vending is a significant element of the urban informal economy (Mazhambe, 2017; Otekhile and Matthew, 2017; Riley, 2014) because it is a source of income, and individuals want to defend their right to earn a living.

Street vending is, however, often criticised by policymakers, formal businesses, and the public. They claim that street vending activities create chaos, unfair competition, slows traffic, and generally facilitates disorder. Since it operates in public space, public authorities have often expressed a desire to formalise it (Batréau and Bonnet, 2015). In this thesis, formalising street vending implies regulating it with a set of rules or policies and allowing it to operate within an accepted legal framework. Hence, regulating street

vending would involve either giving street vendors trading licences or relocating them to formal market structures and specific areas demarcated for trading.

The most evident solution that governments take on to regulate street vending, and hence the focus in this thesis, is relocating the vendors to formal market structures or specific vending areas. These formal market structures are usually not welcome or fall short of expectations from street vendors, and relocation efforts end up unsuccessful like in the case of Zambia (Nchito, 2011; Ndhlovu, 2011), Uganda (Nakazi and Marrion, 2019), Tanzania (Mramba, 2015) and Malawi (Chinsinga and Kayuni, 2011). Relocation efforts have been successful in some cases, for instance, in Quito, Ecuador (Ferragut and Gomez, 2013), and Hsinchu City, Taiwan (Weng and Kim, 2016). Weng and Kim (2016) attribute Hsinchu City's success to street vendors' organisations because they can negotiate for a better market plan and convince their members to conform to it. Ferragut and Gomez (2013) attribute Quito's success to the provision of trading infrastructure since street vendors find it justified to operate roadside when they lack formal market structures. However, the relocation of street vendors had to be analysed further in the context of Malawi. The government of Malawi provided formal market infrastructure, and yet street vending still thrives in the country's major cities (Ngwira, 2019).

Therefore, the study focused on analysing the effectiveness of the street vending relocation policy in Malawi. It chose Lilongwe as the case study area because it is one of the major cities in Malawi, and media reports showed that street vending was still an unsolved problem despite the existence of formal markets (Ngwira, 2019; Sabola, 2019). Boyen (2014) also observed formal market traders chasing street vendors on their own following the failure of the Lilongwe City Council (LCC) to remove them.

1.2 Background

Street vending is one of the most visible activities in the informal sector and estimated to account for the second-largest share of informal sector jobs (Brown and Lyons, 2010; Roever and Skinner, 2016; Skinner, 2008b). Considering that street vending is one of the most visible activities in the informal sector, it is, in the same way, essential to livelihoods. Several scholars acknowledge that street vending makes significant contributions to the economy (Jimu, 2004; Mazhambe, 2017; Otekhile and Matthew,

2017; Riley, 2014). For instance, Mazhambe (2017) assessed the contribution of street vending to the economy of Zimbabwe and found that 86% of street vendors consider it their primary source of income. According to Jimu (2004), not only does it contribute to income distribution in Botswana, but it also promotes marketing for small formal firms. Street vendors get their goods from the formal firms and hence promoting them. Various low-cost, informal networks sustain industries through the distribution of goods in society. Jimu (2004) also views street vending as one of the options for earning a living in the face of increasing poverty. It has ease of entry, requires low skill and capital investment. Therefore, it attracts the poor and uneducated to take part, who would otherwise find it more difficult to earn a living. It also conveniently and cheaply provides goods to the public (Kusakabe, 2006; Riley, 2014). Thus, street vending is one of the ways for the unemployed to earn a living.

The visibility of street vendors makes it impossible to ignore the problems surrounding their activity (Bromley, 2000). Street vendors erect structures that do not conform to building codes or zoning regulations (Otekhile and Matthew, 2017). They are detrimental to city life, unhygienic, and obstruct the smooth flow of pedestrians and traffic (Bantubonse, 2008). They occupy sidewalks, and it forces pedestrians to walk on main roads, creating traffic problems. Individuals working in the formal sector view informality as creating unfair competition because they succumb to regulations and taxes while their counterparts in the informal sector are left scot-free. For instance, formal market traders fear competition from street vendors and lobby for their suppression (Boyen, 2014; Ehrenfeucht, 2016). Such arguments against street vending give governments pressure to do something about it. However, street vending creates a dilemma for the governments to put an end to it because, on the one hand, it is a source of livelihood for the urban poor. On the other hand, people view it as a chaotic activity that needs to be controlled.

Subsequently, one of the interesting debates that revolve around street vending is the idea of formalising it. Street vending as an informal sector activity thrives on the idea that it is unregulated and generally operates outside the formal regulatory framework. In addition, there is the ease of entry in the street vending business. Consequently, it attracts a large number of people who do not have other means of earning a livelihood. Hence, street vendors prefer to remain unregulated. However, governments seek to

confine street vending in a formal regulatory environment to maintain order. For instance, there is literature that documents evictions and relocations of street vendors in many cities across the world (Roever and Skinner, 2016). Similarly, in Malawi, vending can only take place in areas designated for it. Falla (2016) refers to this as the formalisation of street vending because the regulation of licenses, markets, or zones for vending enables street vendors to work within the law. Thus, governments set rules on how and where to operate vending activities.

In 2006, the government of Malawi chased and relocated all street vendors in urban centres to flea markets to keep the streets clean (Kayuni and Tambulasi, 2009). In some instances, the government used teargas to chase the street vendors when they showed resistance towards relocation (Boyen, 2014). Apart from chasing street vendors, the implementation of the relocation policy involves making arrests and confiscating street vendors' goods. Jongh (2015) studied the strategies and practices of street vendors and local authorities and he observed that the LCC has patrolling vehicles and it uses police officers to arrest individuals who vend outside designated market spaces. Hence, the government insists that vending roadside without an appropriate trading licence is illegal and therefore, street vendors should operate in formal markets.

However, there have been reports that street vending in Malawi continues to thrive despite the relocation efforts (Boyen, 2014; Ngwira, 2019). According to Chinsinga and Kayuni (2011), the resilience of street vending is because those involved have no alternatives and they are desperate to survive. It shows that the relocation of street vendors is controversial because, on the one hand, the government wants to relocate street vendors. On the other hand, street vendors are desperate for survival and want to continue operating roadside. Therefore, the controversy presented a good opportunity to analyse the effectiveness of the street vending relocation policy in Malawi.

1.3 Problem statement

Malawi and many other Sub-Saharan African countries have been experiencing rapid population growth and the growth of inhabitants in urban areas. For instance, In 2018, the world population had increased by 1.1% than the previous year while Sub-Saharan Africa and Malawi had grown by 2.68% and 2.9%, respectively (National Statistical Office of Malawi [NSO], 2019; World Bank, 2019). Hence, Malawi's population is

growing faster compared to worldwide population growth. Malawi's urban population has also increased over the years from 1.4 million in 1998 to 2.4 million in 2018 (NSO, 2019). Although the national and urban population is increasing, most of these people find it difficult to get formal jobs in the urban economy due to limited education, skills, and job opportunities. In their quest for making a living, some of these people engage in informal activities, including street vending.

Despite its importance in the urban economy, street vending in Malawi has been criticised by the government, the public, and formal businesses that it creates dirt, congestion, slows traffic, and promotes unfair competition (Boyen, 2014; Jongh, 2015). The government views it as a nuisance that needs to be stopped. There are laws that prohibit street vending (Lilongwe City Assembly [LCA], 2002) and the government has been taking measures to formalise it by relocating street vendors to formal market infrastructure. By 2004, the government had put up formal markets where street vendors could trade, and the implementation of the relocation policy started in 2006.

However, the government fails to formalise street vending. Kayuni and Tambulasi (2009) argued that Malawi successfully relocated all street vendors when the government used force in 2006. However, Chinsinga and Kayuni (2011) contradict this claim as they observed that street vending continues to thrive in the country's major cities. The relocation efforts have been met with resistance from street vendors (Jongh, 2015). According to Ngwira's (2019) media report, local councils spend more resources by hiring police officers to help remove street vendors. Despite the persistent implementation of the relocation policy, there are no tangible results as street vending prevails. Hence, the efforts of relocating street vendors are not only ineffective but also inefficient as individuals continue to trade from the streets regardless. Therefore, it was imperative for this study to analyse the effectiveness of the street vending relocation policy in Malawi because it helps to comprehend why the government fails to formalise street vending.

1.4 Justification

The studies on street vending have focused much on its contributions to society (Jimu, 2004; Mazhambe, 2017; Otekhile and Matthew, 2017; Riley, 2014). Studies done in Malawi have examined the effects of formalising street vending (Kayuni and

Tambulasi, 2009) and the contradictions of governing it (Chinsinga and Kayuni, 2011). However, there has been no specific attention given to analyse the effectiveness of the street vending relocation policy, which this study established as a literature gap. Hence, this study addresses the literature gap by showing the extent to which the LCC effectively implements the relocation policy and exploring the views and reactions of street vendors towards relocation.

As mentioned earlier, street vending has proven to be a source of livelihood for many people, especially the urban poor. Although several studies have recognised its importance (Jimu, 2004; Riley, 2014), there continues to be a struggle when it comes to its formalisation. Malawi is one of the countries that has not been spared in such struggles. The formalisation of street vending continues to be implemented with inefficiency and ineffectiveness. This study is of practical relevance because it provides insight into public policy concerning street vending. It reveals issues that affect the implementation of the street vending relocation policy. Hence, the city councils can make use of this to understand what would enable effective formalisation of street vending.

1.5 Research objectives

1.5.1 Main objective

To analyse the effectiveness of the street vending relocation policy.

1.5.2 Specific objectives

1. To examine the extent to which the LCC effectively implements the street vending relocation policy.
2. To explore street vendors' views and reactions towards the government's relocation policy.

1.6 Research questions

1.6.1 Main question

What is the effectiveness of the street vending relocation policy?

1.6.2 Specific questions

1. How, and to what extent, is the street vending relocation policy effectively implemented by the LCC?
2. How do street vendors view and react to the official relocation policy?

1.7 Structure of the thesis

This thesis has five chapters. Chapter 1 has introduced the study by giving background information, problem statement, objectives, and justification of the study. Chapter 2 reviews literature, which includes the theoretical framework and analytical framework for the thesis. Chapter 3 gives an overview of the methodology and research design. It also explains the sampling techniques, data collection instruments, and the data analysis methods that the study employed. Chapter 4 gives data presentation, analysis, and discussion of the findings. Chapter 5 presents the conclusions, implications of the study and recommendations.

1.8 Conclusion

The street vending relocation policy aims to confine street vendors in a regulated environment, which this chapter has introduced as the formalisation of an informal activity. Although street vending is an opportunity for the urban poor and unemployed to work in the informal economy, it is prohibited. The government of Malawi wants to control the number of street vendors to maintain order and it has been implementing the relocation policy since 2006. Nonetheless, it fails to relocate the street vendors successfully. Hence, the study sought to analyse the effectiveness of the street vending relocation policy.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

This chapter provides the literature review and the theoretical framework of the study. It engages in a theoretical debate of the informal economy, street vending, and the formalisation of street vending. It starts with a discussion of literature concerning the informal economy and the four approaches of looking at it, namely, dualist, structuralist, legalist, and voluntarist approaches. It also discusses the relationship between the informal economy and street vending. Then it discusses the concept of street vending and the factors that drive it. After that, it discusses empirical literature on the formalisation of street vending and the factors that affect it. The literature review aimed to make sure that the research does not merely repeat what other scholars have already done. Furthermore, this section discusses how the voluntarist and the dualist theories work as the theoretical framework of the study.

2.2 The informal economy

Scholarship on the informal economy has a long history. During the 1950s and 1960s, it was referred to as the traditional economy, comprising of petty traders, small-scale production, and casual jobs such as domestic labour. Lewis (1954) developed a theoretical model of economic development that assumed that as the modern industrial sector in developing countries grew, the vast pool of casual workers would be absorbed. He believed that economic growth in developing countries would generate enough new jobs to absorb surplus labour from the traditional economy. However, this transformation did not take place. Instead, more people moved to cities in search of employment, and the scarcity of jobs in the modern economy meant that most of them could only remain in the informal sector. The failure of the modern economy to absorb the informal sector criticises Lewis' (1954) model of economic development. Hart (1973) was one of the scholars who challenged Lewis' model of economic growth by

studying growing informality in Ghana. He argued that the lack of formal jobs, together with the growing number of surplus labour led to a rise in informal activities. Similarly, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) mission to Kenya recognised that the traditional economy, which they called the informal sector, had not just persisted but expanded (ILO, 1972).

The organization Women in Informal Employment: Globalising and Organising (WIEGO) worked with the ILO to broaden the earlier concept and definition of the informal sector (Chen, 2007). The initial description of the informal sector only focused on unregulated businesses. The informal economy is the broadened term for the informal sector. According to Chen (2007), ‘the informal economy is comprised of all forms of informal employment, including unregistered businesses and wage employment in unprotected jobs’ (p. 2). Therefore, the informal economy does not only focus on unregulated businesses but also on employment relationships that are not legally regulated or protected. Chen (2007) explains the key differences between the informal sector and the informal economy, as summarised in Table 1 below.

Table 1: The difference between the informal sector and the informal economy

Informal sector	Informal economy
The traditional economy will wither away with modern industrial growth.	The informal economy is expanding with modern industrial growth, and it is here to stay.
The informal sector is slightly productive.	The informal economy is a significant provider of employment, goods, and services.
The informal sector has illegal entrepreneurs and unregistered enterprises to avoid regulation and taxation.	The informal economy comprises waged workers, entrepreneurs, and self-employed persons producing legal goods and services through unregulated means.
The enterprises in the informal sector are survival activities.	The enterprises in the informal economy include not only survival activities but also stable and dynamic growing businesses.

Source: Chen (2007, p.15)

Both terms, informal sector and informal economy, agree on the idea that their economic activities are not regulated or recognised by the state. Hence, this study used the informal sector, informal economy, and informal economic activities interchangeably based on this similarity.

2.3 Major approaches of informality

The literature on informality has developed different perspectives regarding the causes, nature, and the solutions for the informal economy. Subsequently, there are four approaches of looking at the informal economy, namely: dualist, structuralist, legalist (Chen, 2007) and voluntarist (Chen, 2012). However, the debate tends to blur the distinction between the formal economy and the formal regulatory environment and the relationship of informal enterprises and informal workers to each. Therefore, this section explains how dualism and structuralism see the relationship between the informal economy and the formal economy. It also shows how legalism and voluntarism explain the relationship between the informal economy and formal regulatory environment.

2.3.1 Dualist approach

The dualistic approach to informality, as described in the early literature (Hart, 1973; ILO, 1972), perceives informal economic activities as what people do for themselves beyond the reach of state regulation. Hart (1973) sees the economy as dual, consisting of formal and informal income opportunities. He argues that some individuals work on a wage basis, and these constitute the modern sector. Others are not wage earners and are variously classified as ‘the low productivity urban sector, the reserve army of underemployment and unemployed, the traditional sector, and so on’ (Hart, 1973, p. 68). Individuals outside the modern sector are excluded from formal economic opportunities. Firstly, this is due to the imbalance of growth rates between population and modern industrial employment. Population growth is at a faster rate than employment opportunities in the modern sector. Consequently, the formal sector cannot take up surplus-labour. Secondly, a mismatch between people’s skills and the structure of modern economic opportunities makes it difficult for many workers to be employed in the formal sector (WIEGO, 2014). Therefore, formal units do not have links with informal units. However, informal work provides income and a safety net for those who fail to find employment in the formal sector.

The dualist approach is appreciated in today's global economy because the formal sector does not create enough jobs, and individuals resort to informal employment to earn a living. For instance, ILO (2018) found that two billion of the world's employed population aged 15 and above work informally, representing 61.2% of global employment. Hence, informal employment is here to stay since it is the main source of jobs and income for the majority of people in the world. In response to this, WIEGO (2014) proposes that governments should create more jobs that are formal as well as support informal enterprises by providing them with financial and business development services. Therefore, governments can help to reduce poverty and inequality through job creation and support for informal enterprises.

2.3.2 Structuralist approach

The structuralist approach developed in reaction to the dualists' approach. Contrary to the dualists, structuralists view informal economic activities as systematically linked to capitalist or formal firms. Castells and Portes (1989) propounded this theory, and they focused on the analysis of the modes of production within the capitalist system and the subordinations that occurred within it. According to the structuralist approach, capitalist firms in the formal economy increase output and lower costs of production in an attempt to maintain competitiveness against other formal firms. Subsequently, they reduce their input costs, including labour costs, by promoting informal production and informal employment relationships with subordinated economic units and workers (Chen, 2012). Informality becomes visible when workers are pushed out of the formal sector, where they enjoyed job security, protection, and contracts, and into the informal sector, where they have no protection. The global garment industry exemplifies how formal firms in developed countries contribute to informality as they seek manual labor from individuals in developing countries who sew clothes for low wages, and without social security or contracts (Roeveer, 2015). Hence, informality is due to formal firms' desire to cut down input and labour costs, increase competitiveness, and keep profits.

Formal firms enjoy the benefits of informality, while informal workers suffer the lack of formal sector benefits. For instance, labour laws do not protect street vendors who work on commission for formal firms (Chen, 2012). Street vendors have found themselves to be without legal recognition or protection because they operate informally and cannot access the benefits of working formally. Structuralism

recommends that governments should regulate both commercial and employment relations to address the unequal relationship between formal firms and informal workers (Chen, Jhabvala, and Lund, 2002; WIEGO, 2014). However, the structuralist approach only focuses on alleviating the anomalies caused by working informally but not repressing the informal economy.

2.3.3 Legalist approach

Unlike structuralism and dualism, the legalist approach does not focus on the relationship between the informal economy and the formal economy. Instead, it focuses on the relationship between the informal economy and the formal regulatory environment. The legalist approach, constructed by De Soto (1989), views the informal economy as comprised of informal enterprises and entrepreneurs who avoid burdensome costs, time, and effort of formal registration. Legalists argue that what causes informality is a hostile legal system, cumbersome government rules, and procedures (De Soto, 1989). Thus, taxes and regulations are a burden to individuals in the informal economy, and this forces them to circumvent formal rules and hence escape formalisation.

Legalists believe informal firms should be supported because they have the willingness to formalise if the government provides them property rights and alleviates registration procedures. WIEGO (2014) suggests that governments should introduce simplified bureaucratic procedures to encourage informal enterprises to register and extend legal property rights. Therefore, removing the costs of formality can help individuals in the informal sector to cope with the rules and regulations and unleash their productive potential.

2.3.4 Voluntarist approach

Although dualists view the informal economy as comprising a less advantaged sector (Hart, 1973; ILO, 1972), Maloney (2004), who introduced voluntarism, does not view it as disadvantaged. Instead, he sees it as the unregulated, voluntary, entrepreneurial small firm sector found in advanced and developing countries. Maloney analysed the informal sector in Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina, and offered alternative explanations for many of the characteristics of the informal sector ordinarily regarded as evidence of its inferiority. According to Maloney, the urban informal microenterprise is part of a

voluntary small firm sector that can choose the optimal degree of participation in formal institutions. Therefore, operating in the informal sector is often the optimal decision by individuals given their preferences, the constraints faced in terms of the level of human capital, and the level of formal sector labour productivity in the country.

Similar to the legalist approach, the voluntarist approach focuses on the deliberate decision made by informal operators to avoid regulations. However, voluntarist approach argues that this decision is not only due to the excess of rules demanded by the state. Instead, it also reflects the perception that the benefits of operating in the informality outweigh those of formality (Chen, 2012). According to WIEGO (2014), informal businesses create unfair competition for formal businesses because they avoid legal regulations, taxes, and other costs of production. Therefore, WIEGO proposes that governments should bring informal activities under the formal regulatory environment to increase the tax base and reduce unfair competition by informal enterprises.

2.4 The informal economy and street vending

In developing regions, the concentration of inhabitants in cities and lack of formal sector jobs has contributed to the rapid growth of the informal economy and an increase in informal street trade. Nowhere is this phenomenon more evident than in Sub-Saharan Africa, where growth in urban populations accompanies limited job creation amongst the poor (Brown and Lyons, 2010; Skinner, 2008b). Street vending is a visible occupation in the informal economy (Roever and Skinner, 2016) as it operates in the open air (Chen, 2012). According to Jimu (2004), the discussion of street vending cannot be exhaustive without reference to the informal sector. Many people perceive it as ‘a manifestation, spillover, and often subset of the urban informal sector’ (Jimu, 2004, p. 19). Therefore, street vending is a notable enterprise within the informal sector.

As already discussed, some of the characteristics of the informal sector include small scale, no regulation, ease of entry and exit, and non-requirement of formal skills. Street vending generally has low barriers to entry and low start-up costs (Skinner, 2008b), and it is mostly on a small scale. Since street vending requires little capital investment (Ray and Mishra, 2011), it is easier for low-income groups to engage in street vending compared to trades. Considering that the features of street vending fit those of the

informal sector, it is appropriate to put it as an activity that takes place within the informal economy.

2.5 The concept of street vending

Street vending is found all over the world, both in developed and developing countries (Wongtada, 2014). Available statistics show that it accounts for a large portion of total non-agricultural informal employment in some Asian and Latin American countries. For instance, it makes up 14% in India (Lisette and Roever, 2019) and 9% in Peru (ILO, 2013). It accounts for a more significant portion of total non-agricultural informal employment in African cities. Skinner (2008b) argues that it forms 15% to 25% in African cities. Recent data, according to ILO (2013), shows that it forms 12% to 24% in eight African cities, with 14% in Ghana and 15% in South Africa. Hence, these statistics suggest that street vending is more pertinent in Africa than the rest of the world. Therefore, Africa presents an excellent opportunity for studying street vending because the magnitude of street vendors is relatively large.

Street vendors are people who offer goods for sale from the streets without permanent structures from which to sell (Bhowmik, 2005). Although numerous scholars have defined street vending differently (Amoah-Mensah, 2016; Bhowmik, 2005; Bromley, 2000), a common element in their definitions is the location of trade. For instance, Bromley (2000) defined street vending as the retail or wholesale trading of goods and services ‘in streets and other related public axes’ (p.1). Whether stationary or mobile, an individual selling a product on the street is a street vendor.

Apart from the location aspect, another approach to defining street vending is by looking at its legality. This approach uses a broad range of legal infringements as the defining criterion (Brown et al., 2010). For instance, Cross (1998) defines street vending as the production and exchange of goods and services ‘without appropriate business permits, failure to report tax liability and violation of zoning codes’ (p. 580). The legality approach conforms to how street vending in Malawi is defined. The Lilongwe City Council market by-laws states that no one should engage in street vending within the city area unless permitted by the local council (LCA, 2002). Nonetheless, the government denies many street vendors business permits as it tries to limit street vending and cannot give every applicant a licence.

Research has shown that street vendors are not a homogenous group (Jongh, 2015; Wongtada, 2014). Wongtada's (2014) analysis of street vending literature from across the world shows that street vendors comprise of fixed-stall and mobile vendors. Fixed-stall vendors operate from street pavements while mobile sellers who move around, vending from one location to another. Jimu (2004) views street vendors as individuals that offer various goods and services ranging from 'fruits and vegetables, clothes, cell phone chargers, and repair services' (p. 25). Thus, the literature acknowledges that street vendors can be fixed or mobile, and they sell many kinds of goods. Jongh (2015) adopted Jimu's view of street vendors while exploring the tensions between local authorities and street vendors in Malawi. His findings, however, show that Jimu's view had clamped two kinds of street vendors together – legal and illegal. Malawi has both types. Authorised street vendors are the ones permitted by the local council to operate on the streets. Some of these are airtime sellers and second-hand vehicle vendors, just to mention a few. Jongh found that most of the illegal street vendors are mobile and carry a few items, such as groundnuts, fruits and vegetables, and second-hand clothes. Local councils do not permit these street vendors; hence, they operate out of defiance and risk arrests and paying fines to the city council when caught.

This study used both the location and legality aspects to define a street vendor. It adopted Bhowmik's (2005) definition that states that a street vendor is a person trading from the street without a permanent built-up structure. It also took Cross' (1998) definition that states that a street vendor is someone who lacks appropriate business permits and violates zoning codes. Defining a street vendor from a legal perspective was necessary for this study to separate legal from illegal vendors. This study focused on street vendors whose operation takes place outside the prevailing regulatory environment and are considered illegal. Therefore, street vendors in this study are fixed or mobile vendors, selling any type of goods and services on the streets, without a permanently built structure. Also, they operate without permission from the council and thus, violate the law.

2.6 Factors that drive street vending

Several factors drive street vending. Nonetheless, they can be put in two broad categories – pull and push factors. On the one hand, the benefits associated with street vending pull individuals into the activity. Although the attractiveness of street vending

can be easily noted in developed countries where it is a relatively more rewarding enterprise than other informal enterprises (Hanewald, 2015), several scholars (Kusakabe, 2006; Riley, 2014) note that it is also an attractive enterprise to entrepreneurs in developing countries. On the other hand, socio-economic forces push individuals into street vending, especially in developing countries where people attempt to rescue from economic hardship in the context of high unemployment (Bhowmik, 2005), low education qualification (Hart, 1973), and poverty (Brown, Kafafy, and Hayder, 2017). Therefore, street vending is a result of a contribution of all the forces that pull and push individuals into the activity. This subsection reviews what various scholars have argued drives street vending.

2.6.1 Lack of formal jobs

A general explanation of street vending is the scarcity of formal employment (Bhowmik, 2005; Forkuor, Akuoko, and Yeboah, 2017; Mahzambe, 2017). The lack of formal jobs pushes people into the informal sector. For instance, Bhowmik (2005), while analysing the magnitude of street vending in different countries, notes that the growth of street vending in Asia is due to the shrinking of jobs in the formal sector. He argues that the rural unemployed find it difficult to find regular formal jobs when they move to urban areas in search of employment. Forkuor et al. (2017) agree by arguing that street vending serves as a source of jobs and income for urban residents all over the world, especially in developing countries. Some individuals resort to street vending because they fail to find other means of livelihood. These examples imply that many informal economic activities globally grew out of the lack of formal sector jobs. Hence, street vendors persist because they fail to find jobs and take street vending as a last resort to survive.

2.6.2 Poverty

Poverty pushes individuals into informal economic activities, including street vending. The urban poor people around the world often consider street vending as an activity necessary for their survival. For the urban poor, street vendors provide goods, including food, at low prices, and middle-income groups benefit from affordable prices (Bhowmik, 2005). Handoyo and Setiawan (2018) argue that street vendors in Indonesia use public spaces, including sidewalks because they cannot afford to operate in other locations that require paying. Data analysis by ILO (2018) shows that there is a positive

correlation between poverty and informality, ‘with the poor facing higher rates of informal employment’ (p. 48). Poor people are more likely to work in the informal economy because it requires little capital investment than the formal economy. Several scholars also note that the street has become the new locus of employment for the urban poor (Brown et al., 2017; Iyenda, 2005; Uwitije, 2016). Uwitije (2016) found that street vendors in Rwanda make an average of 7.2 USD per day and have an average of three household members. The international poverty line is 1.9 USD per day, and this means that an average street vendor and their family in Rwanda can live above the poverty line (2.4 USD). According to IMF (2017), 69% of the population in Malawi live under the international poverty line. Data on the amount of money that street vendors earn in Malawi is not available. Nevertheless, Kayuni and Tambulasi (2009) note that street vendors used to make much money before relocation efforts. Therefore, street vending has the potential to uplift individuals above the poverty line.

Contrarily, Iyenda (2005) argues that street vending has not proven to be a solution to poverty. Although street vending provides low-level incomes to many households in the Democratic Republic of Congo, it cannot develop a country (Iyenda, 2005). It contains some profit, but it is unable to lift poor people out of chronic poverty. Despite street vending’s inability to offset poverty at the macro-level, it has the potential at the micro-level. Street vending has shown to be an activity that helps sustain the lives of the urban poor like in the case of Rwanda.

2.6.3 Low levels of education

The lack of formal education is another factor that pushes people to street vending. A large number of street vendors possess low skills or education (Hanewald, 2015); hence, they migrated from rural areas in search of employment. Less educated people find it harder to find formal jobs than the more educated, and informal economic opportunities offer a ladder out of unemployment. In an exploratory study of the working life of street vendors in India, Saha (2011) shows that only 10% of street vendors had reached secondary school. Uwitije’s (2016) study in Kigali, Rwanda, shows that only 27% reached secondary school. Ndhlovu (2011) observes that street vendors in Zambia often have limited education. It implies that most street vendors have limited education and it is more difficult for them to find regular jobs in the formal

sector. Street vendors find it relatively easy to work in the informal sector because it requires low capital and skills.

However, street vending is not exclusive for uneducated individuals. Due to the lack of formal jobs, educated people also fail to find formal employment and resort to informal work. For instance, Hart (1973) observes that middle-school leavers in the Ghanaian urban labour market found their qualifications inadequate for white-collar jobs. Hence, they competed with uneducated individuals in the informal sector. Therefore, street vending is one of the few options individuals use to earn a living despite their level of skills or formal education.

2.6.4 Flexibility

Apart from the push factors, opportunities found in the informal sector pull street vendors. In other words, the benefits gained from street vending activities attract street vendors. Hanewald (2015) studied the motivations of rural-urban migrant street entrepreneurs in Shenzhen, China, and found that reasons for street vending are diverse. While the majority are born out of necessity, some make a rational choice to become street vendors. For instance, he found that people value street vending because they want to enjoy the flexibility of being self-employed. Huang, Zhang, and Xue (2017) also analysed the motivations of street vendors in China and found that autonomy is particularly important for female migrant workers. The flexibility and independence of street vending allow them some control over their lives while earning a living. Many of them gave up waged jobs after marriage. They started street vending to balance work and their family responsibilities, such as cooking, house cleaning, and childcare. Thus, street vending provides an opportunity for flexibility and self-employment, and this attracts street vendors.

2.6.5 Costs of formality

Costly and cumbersome business registration procedures encourage individuals to operate in the informal sector. Individuals who cannot afford to pay taxes or fees for formal operations opt to join the informal sector. De Soto (1989) argues that people choose to remain informal to avoid the costs of formality. He describes these costs in terms of strict rules and regulations, taxes, time, and effort involved in complying with formal state procedures. The expenses of formality explain why some vendors remain

on the streets even after the provision of market infrastructure. Some vendors do not have enough capital and avoid paying fees for operating in markets. For instance, Nchito (2011) analyses factors leading to the increasing number of street vendors in Lusaka, Zambia, even after the provision of modern market infrastructure. She notes that some traders are excluded from formal markets based on, among other things, the inability to pay for their use. Hence, informal traders excluded from market structures ‘feel justified to stay on the streets’ (Nchito, 2011, p. 88). Jongh (2015) similarly found that one of the reasons for street vending in Malawi is due to vendors’ lack of capital to occupy a spot in designated markets. However, the market fees are collected as government revenue. Therefore, market fees create a dilemma for the government because, on the one hand, the costs of operating under the formal regulatory environment discourage vendors to sell from formal markets. On the other hand, failure to collect market fees means that the government would miss revenue collection targets.

2.6.6 Entrepreneurship

Street vending also gives a chance for entrepreneurs to gain more income. In as much as street vending is regarded as a job for the urban poor (Brown et al., 2017), it also involves entrepreneurs who are not in inferior social groups (Kusakabe, 2006; Mitullah, 2003b). Numerous entrepreneurs have entered the trade as an option, primarily since the beginning of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) that resulted in the retrenchment of civil servants across Africa (Mitullah, 2003b). Kusakabe’s (2006) overview of street vending in Cambodia and Mongolia, Thailand, shows that it has become organised and more difficult for those with little capital to enter. Individuals with little capital become waged street vendors for middle-income people (Kusakabe, 2006). Hence, street vending is not only a choice for the urban poor but is also an attractive occupation for the educated middle class. Individuals with jobs in the formal sector also have the chance to work in the informal sector. Some households use a mix of formal and informal strategies to earn a living (Ehrenfeucht, 2016). Street vending and other informal services can supplement formal work. Entrepreneurs have seen the potentials of street vending, and they choose to venture into it because it is a chance to make more money. Nonetheless, the motivations for participating in street vending are heterogeneous. Hence, various opportunities offered by street vending draw more people into it. Therefore, street vending is not only for survival but also for a profitable opportunity.

2.6.7 Support from customers

Another factor that pulls people into street vending is its patronage from customers. Street vending is applauded for being a source of items for the public (Riley, 2014; Uwitije, 2016). Street vendors provide food, services, and commodities at lower prices and convenient locations (Riley, 2014). Street vendors sell various goods such as second-hand clothes, vegetables, fruits, foodstuffs, plastic products, and other household necessities. In many countries, the urban poor prefer to buy clothes and accessories from street vendors because their products are usually cheaper and affordable than those found in formal retail shops (Ehrenfeucht, 2016; Ray and Mishra, 2011). Middle-income groups also benefit from street vendors because of their affordable prices (Ray and Mishra, 2011). Wheeler (2018) argues that people in the United States support street vendors because they fill voids that organised businesses cannot enter. For instance, they provide food in low-income neighbourhoods of colour. In addition, Ehrenfeucht (2016) notes that in the United States, consumers patronise street vendors because their goods are inexpensive and convenient. Similarly, street vending in Malawi provides crucial resources in terms of both household income and the distribution of essential goods for many low-income urban people (Riley, 2014). Thus, the support given to street vendors encourages them to continue vending roadside.

2.7 The formalisation of street vending

One of the policy debates on the informal economy asks whether and how to formalise the informal economy (Chen, 2012). The answers to these questions depend on the meaning of formalisation. Chen (2012) gives examples of what different observers perceive as the formalisation of the informal economy. She argues that, to some, it means shifting informal workers to formal wage jobs; this requires creating more formal wage jobs. For others, such as informal waged workers, it means securing their career with a contract, worker benefits, and membership in an official trade union. It may also mean registering and taxing informal enterprises. Hence, workers in the informal economy see their formalisation differently because they are not the same group. All these examples show that formalisation has different meanings and implications for various categories of people in the informal economy.

Given the above examples (Chen, 2012), formalising the informal economy can take two approaches. The first approach to formalisation involves taking the informal economy into the formal economy (Chen, 2007; Chen, 2012). The formal sector comprises of regulated economic units and protected workers. From this perspective, formalisation means regulating informal economic units and protecting informal workers. For instance, Ferragut and Gomez (2013) describe formalisation as an intervention aimed at bringing into the formal economy individuals who have been earning income in the informal economy. In this case, formalisation would mean allowing the formal sector to absorb the informal sector.

The second approach to formalisation involves taking the informal economy into the formal regulatory environment (Chen, 2007; Chen, 2012). The formal regulatory environment comprises government policies, laws, and regulations. Hence, formalising the informal economy means placing informal activities under government policies and legislation. For instance, those concerned about street vendors focus on the management of urban space and informal trade (Chen, 2007). Hence, formalising their activity would mean bringing street vending in line with government policies or laws. In agreement with this, Falla (2016) refers to the formalisation of street vending as the regulation of licenses, markets, or zones that enable street vendors to work within the law. Taking into account the different meanings of formalisation, the feasibility of formalising various activities in the informal economy is unclear. Therefore, each informal business, including street vending, needs to be analysed in isolation on how to formalise it.

Governments attempt to formalise street vending as a way of creating decent urban environments (Roever and Skinner, 2016). They try to control the number of street vendors through the issuance of permits and designation of specific areas for vending. However, the licences cannot be given to all street vendors because authorities try to limit the number of individuals that operate roadside. The designated areas also have weaknesses because they usually fall short of some vendors' expectations and cannot accommodate all street vendors. Many individuals depend on street vending for their survival and cannot afford to stop selling. For instance, Jongh (2015) found that many street vendors in Lilongwe and Blantyre, Malawi continue to operate roadside when denied a licence. Another option for formalising street vending involves relocating the

vendors to designated areas. This option has been met by resistance in many African countries, including Uganda (Nakazi and Marrion, 2019), Tanzania (Mramba, 2015), Zambia (Nchito, 2011) and Malawi (Boyen, 2014). Therefore, the formalisation of street vending requires an analysis of what works for all kinds of street vendors for it to be effective.

2.7.1 The role of government

A central government has the power to formulate national policies. Some scholars observe that street vending can gain prominence when the central government backs it, and it becomes unpopular when unsupported (Kayuni and Tambulasi, 2009; Nchito, 2011). For instance, street vending in Zambia flourished when President Fredrick Chiluba showed support in 1993 as it gave street vendors a feeling of legitimacy (Nchito, 2011). Similarly, street vending in Malawi flourished during the Presidency of Bakili Muluzi, who supported it. It became unpopular during the Presidency of late Bingu wa Mutharika, who opposed and executed the forceful removal of street vendors (Kayuni and Tambulasi, 2009). Therefore, the central government has the power to influence street vending regulations.

Although the central government develops national policies regarding street vending, the implementation rests with local governments who have the authority to manage it in their respective jurisdictions (Batréau and Bonnet, 2015; Bromley, 2000; Hernández, 2017). Due to decentralisation, local governments have the authority to decide on how to govern the area under their control. One primary activity of local government is to manage the use of space by contending actors, to issue regulations on its use by contending parties, and to police the implementation of such rules. Other roles of local government are the issuing of trading licenses, collection of market fees, zoning, and safety of public space. The decentralised management provides an interface between those working in the informal sector and local authorities (Skinner, 2008b); hence, the local government serves as the main counterpart that interacts with street vendors. Negotiations may occur regarding the acceptable use of public space, the rights of street vendors to operate from public spaces, and the power of the state to maintain public spaces (Forkuor et al., 2017). Nevertheless, in the end, the local government decides how to regulate street vending.

Most urban authorities in Asian (Bhowmik, 2005; Kusakabe, 2006), Latin American (Hayden, 2017), and African countries (Roever and Skinner, 2016) look at street vending as an activity that creates chaos in cities. In Thailand, for example, the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration believes street vendors are a nuisance that tarnishes the city's tourism image (Kusakabe, 2014). In Mexico, concerns about diseases, and unruly crowds fuelled the efforts of modernisers in Mexico to restrict street commerce in the nation's capital (Hayden, 2017). In many African countries, including Malawi, the general feeling about street vending is that it increases crime, theft, and violence (Roever and Skinner, 2016). Thus, there is a common trend all over the world of viewing street vending as a regressive activity.

Street vending activities are usually not recognised or protected under legal and regulatory frameworks except for the case of India. Street vendors in India have a right to carry on street vending activities in the vending zones allocated to them under the terms and conditions mentioned in the certificate of vending (Gupta and Gupta, 2014). Nonetheless, many countries restrict street vending and emphasise its illegality. Hayden (2017) notes that despite laws that deem street vending illegal, some street vendors in Mexico are in ambiguous legality, also called 'a grey area' (p.26). A grey area is where urban authorities sometimes illegitimately allow street vendors to operate in some streets. Jongh (2015) also makes a similar observation in Malawi, where local authorities decide which street vendors are legal or illegal. The local government uses by-laws to define the illegality of street vending. As such, anyone who engages in street vending without permission from the local council violates the law. However, Jongh (2015) finds that there are some types of street vending considered more suitable even when they do not obtain a license from the council. Despite the provision of the law, it shows that local government authorities are at the centre of deciding which types of street vendors to legalise.

There have been challenges of regulating street vendors in many countries. Many cities experience cycles in which local authorities tolerate, regulate, and then evict street vendors. Law enforcement against street vending in the Global South fluctuates between tolerance and eviction of street vendors (Racaud, Kago, and Owuor, 2018). The implementation depends on several factors, including economic trends, election cycles, and other urban management pressures. Local authorities tend to tolerate street

vending when they do not have the funds for law enforcement. They also tolerate street vending during election periods because politicians seek votes from the street vendors (Nchito, 2011; Young, 2018). However, local authorities also succumb to pressure from interested parties to enforce the law.

Skinner (2008a) notes that the extreme of law enforcement is the forceful eviction from public space. In less severe cases, street vendors face relocation to alternative areas, but often to less productive locations with fewer pedestrians and inadequate facilities. Street vendors end up opposing relocation efforts when they do not fit their expectations. For example, Mramba (2015) observed that street vendors deny occupying infrastructure provided by the government in Tanzania. Similarly, street vendors in Zomba, Malawi, complained about the location of flea markets and opposed relocation efforts (Tambulasi and Kayuni, 2009). Hence, relocation efforts can either be ineffective due to poor implementation or street vendors' resistance.

2.8 Factors affecting street vendors' relocation

This subsection presents empirical literature from different countries on the factors that affect the relocation of street vendors. The significant factors identified are the lack of street vendors' representation, politics, and provision of infrastructure.

2.8.1 Lack of street vendors' representation

The rules and decisions made by governments have direct impacts on street vendors' main economic activity (Carré, Horn, and Bonner, 2018). As such, street vendors and their organisations deal primarily with local and sometimes national authorities. There is literature that suggests that the lack of street vendors' representation or organisations affects the relocation process (Mitullah, 2003b; Weng and Kim, 2016). The representatives engage in negotiations with the government and are supposed to represent the interests of the street vendors. They also have better-detailed knowledge about the practical needs of street vendors' livelihoods, which is key to devising any successful street vendor relocation program (Mitullah, 2003b). Weng and Kim (2016) conducted a study in Taiwan to find out the factors that affect the relocation of street vendors. Taiwan presents a good example because the Hsinchu municipal government successfully relocated street vendors in one instance but failed in another situation to replicate this success. They found that, in the first case, relocation was successful

because Hsinchu Street Vendors' Union (HSVU) had more autonomy in managing the process and it assisted the government in responding to street vendors' needs. The second case was unsuccessful because the municipality managed the process. Even though the government tried to foster a street vending organisation, the government mainly controlled the market, and it was unresponsive to vendors' needs. Therefore, the lack of involvement of street vendors' representatives can break the implementation of the relocation program for failing to understand and meet street vendors' needs.

The street vendors' organisations need to be representative enough to articulate the interests of the street vendors effectively. Thus, poor representation can lead to ineffective policies because street vendors would be less willing to conform to designs that do not consider their interests. However, street vendors are challenging to bring together in some countries because they do not belong to any organisation (Skinner, 2008a), unlike their counterparts in formal markets. For instance, Nchito (2011) notes that street vendors in Zambia neither belong to street vendors' organisations nor register with the local authorities. Hence, despite the presence of street vendors' organisations, there is no direct representation because of street vendors' lack of affiliation. Without representation, relocation efforts are fruitless. Ndhlovu (2011) surveyed Lusaka, Zambia, to analyse why street vendors do not relocate to formal markets. She found that one of the reasons was their dissatisfaction with relocation because they do not participate in any decisions that the local government makes concerning street vending. According to Ndhlovu's survey, overlooking the voices of the traders in decisions of building formal market infrastructure led to increased street vending in the Lusaka district. Therefore, the lack of street vendors' affiliation with organisations makes their representation weak, and they cannot effectively negotiate with the government.

Similarly, Mitullah (2003b) notes that the relocation policy in Nairobi, Kenya, would have been more successful if street vendors had a unifying body. The successful relocation of street vendors requires a unifying organisation that can effectively advocate and negotiate on their behalf. According to Mitullah, city authorities chose to interact with representatives of street traders drawn from different areas of the central business districts. However, the role of these representatives was mainly 'to listen to the packages being offered by the authorities, as opposed to negotiation and dialogue' (Mitullah, 2003b, p. 17). In Mitullah's view, this listening role made negotiations for

appropriate relocation sites impossible. Chinsinga and Kayuni (2011) also cite that one of the reasons for the unsuccessful relocation of street vendors in Malawi is the lack of adequate representation. The Malawi Union for Informal Sector (MUFIS) is one of the organisations aimed at mobilising, defending, and representing vendors' interests at various forums. Despite this attractive organisation, vendors do not recognise the MUFIS (Chinsinga and Kayuni, 2011) and, therefore, the organisation's interests are questionable because they do not directly represent those of the vendors. Effective representation of street vendors is vital to make their voices heard and to influence the relocation policy.

2.8.2 Politics

Global trends of democracy and decentralisation have opened up a political arena that people use to influence policies (Brown et al., 2010). The nature of street vending makes it fundamentally inseparable from the political environment in which it takes place. The state has responsibility for urban management and development that street vendors must put up. Nonetheless, street vendors negotiate with the state to access public space. Among other things, they use democracy as an opportunity to assert their right to economic activity. Freedom has given people the political right to vote for their representatives in government. According to Young (2018), political rights allow street vendors to leverage their power as voters when claiming the right to participate in their activities. Using this power, street vendors can influence or minimise the enforcement of street vending regulation. It suggests that political interests play a significant role in the relocation of street vendors. For instance, the Kampala City Council in Uganda implemented some initiatives from the years 2000 to 2010 aimed at regulating street vending. Nonetheless, street vending was still prevalent. While studying the politics of street vending in Kampala, Uganda, Young (2017) argues that 'democracy opened a period in which vendors could trade political support for protection' (p.1). Politicians were more interested in political survival than the implementation of policy (Young, 2017). Hence, street vending flourishes when the political environment favours it.

Similarly, Nchito (2011) notes that street vendors take advantage of political uncertainty. In Lusaka, politicians protect street vendors during election time because they seek to get their votes (Nchito, 2011; Ndhlovu, 2011). Street vendors take advantage of these political interests and maximise the benefits of selling from the

streets. This situation tends to undermine the efforts of relocating street vendors because the local government neglects law enforcement to satisfy political interests. Without political representatives, street vendors lose their ability to influence decisions in local councils. For instance, street vendors in Kampala lost their political influence in 2011 when the central government introduced a new city government, the Kampala Capital City Authority (KCCA). Unlike the previous city government, which elected politicians controlled, centrally appointed technocrats control the new city government (Young, 2017). Technocrats derive their legitimacy from their ability to direct development and urban management. Therefore, they have more reasons to implement policies than to sympathise with street vendors.

Malawi also witnessed a situation when local councils did not have elected representatives from 2004 to 2014, and Chief Executives appointed by the president provisionally run them (Kayuni and Tambulasi, 2009; Riley, 2014). Kayuni and Tambulasi (2009) argue that the absence of local councillors in Malawi is one of the reasons why the relocation of street vendors in 2006 was a ‘success’ (p. 87). Street vendors had lost one of their channels of influence on street vending policy because they did not have representatives in local councils. Street vendors could not withstand regulation because of the closed political space. Hence, closed political space encourages local governments to implement the relocation policy. Although politics plays a significant role in the relocation of street vendors, other factors also need consideration for the effective relocation of street vendors. Effectively relocating street vendors takes more than just forcing them off the streets. The constructed formal market sites need to be able to attract and retain vendors. The failure of markets to keep vendors means that street vending can continue to flourish with or without the involvement of political interests.

2.8.3 Infrastructure

Many cities all over the world perceive street vendors to be unhygienic, detrimental to city life, noisy and obstructing the smooth flow of pedestrians and traffic. These problems are, to some extent, due to insufficient spaces and infrastructure for street vendors. Ferragut and Gomez (2013) found that the provision of infrastructure is vital for the relocation of street vendors. The municipality of Quito wanted to formalise street vending by relocating the vendors to a designated area (Ferragut and Gomez, 2013).

Subsequently, a registration process began in 1991 up to 2003. The construction of shopping centres for street vendors began in 1998. By June 2003, all the registered street vendors had moved into the formal market stores. The provision of infrastructure is thus essential when relocating street vendors. However, in this case, only vendors registered with the municipality were entitled to obtain a store in the constructed markets. Ferragut and Gomez note that about 3000 street vendors did not manage to register and could not get a store. The implication is that some street vendors cannot be able to use the constructed markets because of limited access. According to Nchito (2011), street vendors excluded from accessing such structures find it justified to remain on the streets. Besides, a new set of traders who claim to be part of those excluded, join street trading hence proliferating the street vending problem, as Nchito notes in the case of Lusaka. The provision of adequate infrastructure is thus an essential aspect of the effective formalisation of street vending.

City authorities find it justified to relocate street vendors after the provision of infrastructure. However, the location of infrastructure needs consideration for its practical use. Uwitije (2016) found that 83% of street vendors in Kigali, Rwanda, would be willing to move from the streets to alternative spaces for trading because they want a stable environment. However, alternative spaces for trading should be places that are easily accessible and attract customers to be able to make profits (Uwitije, 2016). According to Chinsinga and Kayuni (2011), vendors complain about the location of markets in Blantyre and Zomba, Malawi, because they are 'located in areas that are not frequently used by their customers' (p.117). Street vendors prefer to have access to customers in order to make higher volumes of sales. The failure to find access to customers in the formal markets means that the vendors can opt to search for customers roadside. Therefore, apart from the provision of infrastructure, the accessibility of the markets is also of importance to street vendors.

Although several studies (Ferragut and Gomez, 2013; Nchito, 2011; Uwitije, 2016), as explained earlier, have claimed the importance of providing infrastructure, reasons for street vending are heterogeneous. The problem of street vending is context-specific. Some of the cases have shown the possibility of formalising street vendors by providing them with infrastructure. However, there are other examples of failed relocation efforts in Zambia, Uganda, and Malawi, just to mention a few.

2.9 Street vending in Malawi

The growth of street vending in Malawi is generally attributed to political and economic liberalisation (Jongh, 2015). The one-party era was characterised by centralised control of economic activities and political discourse. During the 1970s and 1980s, the autocratic leader Dr. Kamuzu Banda centralised control of the use of public space to maintain a good image of Malawi's cities (Riley, 2014). The government suppressed informal activities, including street vending. Street vending began to flourish during the multiparty era. The 1994 Constitution guaranteed economic freedom for Malawians, which many interpreted as the freedom to engage in commercial activities (Kayuni and Tambulasi, 2009). In addition, the first President of the multiparty era, Bakili Muluzi, encouraged entrepreneurialism and called himself the 'minister of vendors' (Kayuni and Tambulasi, 2009, p 86). As a result, street vending expanded in many urban centres of Malawi.

Street vending, as an informal activity, is a source of livelihood for many unemployed Malawians. For instance, Riley (2014) studied the consequences of street vendor evictions on urban food security in Blantyre. He found that street vending provides crucial resources to many low-income urban people. He notes that street vendor evictions affect how low-income households earn a living in the informal sector, and it makes food less physically accessible. Street vending thus fulfils essential functions within urban areas by being a source of income and improving the proximity of where to buy food.

Despite the contributions of street vending to society, the government seldom supports it. The end 1990s saw street vending as an issue of public debate in Malawi (Chinsinga and Kayuni, 2011). Just like many countries all over the world, the general feeling was that street vending increased congestion on the roads. The public complained of crime and incidents of violence. The spread of street vending also led to the deterioration of the beauty of cities. Formal traders complained that street vendors were blocking their customers. In one instance, a group of market traders took matters into their own hands and chased street vendors plying their trade roadside (Boyen, 2014). Altogether, these arguments gave the government pressure to regulate street vending in Malawi.

According to Kayuni and Tambulasi (2009), Muluzi made efforts to ‘formalise’ street vending during his second term (p. 86). The Muluzi led government-built flea markets in Zomba, Blantyre, Lilongwe, and Mzuzu through the Local Government Development Project under Malawi Social Action Fund (United Democratic Front, 2004). However, the government failed to formalise street vending despite building the flea markets. The government insisted that vendors must conduct their business in flea markets, which were too small to accommodate all active vendors (Riley, 2014). Subsequently, the street vendors refused to relocate. Therefore, the lack of alternatives and the desperation for survival convinces the street vendors to continue operating roadside.

Chinsinga and Kayuni (2011) analysed the feasibility of relocating street vendors in Blantyre and Zomba, Malawi. Their study revealed that one of the problems of the implementation of the relocation policy is the failure to incorporate street vendors’ views. However, Chinsinga and Kayuni (2011) only used a qualitative approach in their study. It was essential to combine a qualitative and quantitative approach to triangulate the data, and the advantage of using a mixed-method is that it balances the weaknesses of either approach.

The relocation agenda was implemented with zeal in 2006 during the reign of late Bingu wa Mutharika. Kayuni and Tambulasi (2009) claimed that the formalisation of street vending was successful in 2006 because the government removed all street vendors in urban centres and relocated them to the flea markets by force. Observably, their conclusion was erroneous because street vending continues to thrive in some of the streets in Lilongwe, Mzuzu, and Blantyre (Ngwira, 2019). While analysing the strategies of street vendors and local authorities, Jongh (2015) notes that there continues to be tension between the two parties, and the street vendors resist evictions. Hence, formalising street vending is still a challenge in Malawi.

2.10 Theoretical framework for the study

This study identified the voluntarist theory and the dualist theory to be the most relevant theories to help explain the effectiveness of the street vending relocation policy in Malawi. The relocation of street vendors shows government efforts to repress street vending and place the vendors under formal markets. The voluntarist theory was

relevant in this study as it explains the relationship between informal enterprises and the formal regulatory environment. It explains why street vending exists and it makes inferences of how the government can effectively place street vendors under formal regulations. Although the legalist theory (De Soto, 1989) also discusses the relationship between the informal economy and the formal regulatory environment, it was less relevant in this study because it only focuses on the idea that street vending is a result of burdensome costs. Whereas, the voluntarist theory argues that several reasons cause street vending, including burdensome costs and the benefits of operating informally (Maloney, 2004). Therefore, the voluntarist theory embraces more ideas that can explain street vending, including those of legalists.

The dualist theory does not focus much on the relationship between the informal economy and the formal regulatory environment. Rather, it focuses on the relationship between the informal economy and formal economy. However, it was also relevant in this study because its causal theory validly explains why individuals engage in street vending. Therefore, it was used to comprehend street vendors' views and reactions towards the relocation policy. Although the structuralist theory (Castells and Portes, 1989) also discusses the relationship between the formal economy and the informal economy, it was not relevant in this study because, firstly, its suppositions have more explanatory power on the inequalities faced by informal workers due to capitalism. Secondly, it does not focus on repressing the informal economy, but rather, aims to alleviate the problems created by capitalism. Hence, structuralism did not have any bearing on the problem under study in this thesis. According to Chen (2012), no theory is superior to the other; however, the choice of a theory depends on the enterprises under investigation. Therefore, this section looks at how the voluntarist theory and the dualist theory helped to answer the research questions in this thesis.

2.10.1 The voluntarist theory

Maloney (2004) developed the voluntarist theory as he explained the characteristics of informal sector in Latin America. According to Maloney, the informal sector is a result of the rational choice of micro-entrepreneurs after a careful cost-benefit analysis of being formal versus informal. Maloney argues that the choice to operate formally or informally involves taking into account monetary (income generation and tax payments) and non-monetary (flexibility and independence) costs and benefits. For

example, literature shows some individuals deliberately choose street vending because of its flexibility, like in the case of China (Hanewald, 2015). Others choose street vending because they can generally make more money through it (Kusakabe, 2006). Operating in the informal sector does not represent an inferior position (Maloney, 2004). Instead, working in the informal sector is relatively better than being formal because it provides more satisfaction than the latter. Therefore, the voluntarist theory shows that street vending is a result of a rational choice made by individuals to enjoy the benefits of informality.

According to Maloney, government policy is able to affect the cost-benefit analysis underlying the choice to move ‘towards or away from informality’ (p. 1173). Voluntarists recommend policies that attempt to make the formal sector more attractive than the informal sector by increasing the satisfaction of formality and decreasing that of informality. The implication of the voluntarist theory is that individuals in the informal economy can operate under the formal regulatory environment when it provides better satisfaction than operating informally (Maloney, 2004). In addition, decreasing the utility of informality through repressive policies, including effective law enforcement and increased penalties for offenders can increase the number of individuals opting for formality (Hernández, 2017). Hence, the street vending relocation policy can be effective when the government implements policies that limit street vending. Furthermore, it can also be effective when it provides street vendors with formal markets that give them more excellent utility than operating informally. The voluntarist theory explains why some street vendors decide to operate informally when they find the formal markets unappealing (Nchito, 2011; Ndhlovu, 2011). Therefore, effective policies need to make the formal regulatory environment more appealing and attractive than the informal sector.

Given the above, this study used the voluntarist theory because, firstly, it validly explains the relationship between the informal sector and the formal regulatory environment. It helps to understand why street vendors choose to operate informally despite the existence of the formal regulatory environment. Secondly, the voluntarist theory can help a government to come up with effective strategies of formalising street vending because it focuses on understanding what gives street vendors greater satisfaction. For instance, several authors have shown that the provision of

infrastructure is necessary for the effective relocation of street vendors (Ferragut and Gomez, 2013; Nchito, 2011; Ndhlovu, 2011). According to Nchito (2011), the lack of infrastructure justifies street vendors' choice of operating informally. Thus, acknowledging the significant voluntary component gives important policy implications. It shows that formalisation requires providing street vendors with better options than those of informality.

According to Chen (2012), the voluntarist theory may not describe well the characteristics of every subsector because the informal economy is very heterogeneous. The deficiency in the voluntarist theory is that it fails to acknowledge that street vending is not only a result of rational choice, but also the urge to survive. Hence, the dualist theory was better placed to make up for the deficiency in the voluntarist theory. The dualist theory does not see informality as a choice. Rather, it views informality as a result of poverty and the lack of formal employment. In response to poverty and the lack of jobs, individuals have no choice but to engage in informal activities, including street vending to survive (Hart, 1973). Hence, the voluntarist theory fails to consider that informality can also be a result of the lack of jobs in the formal economy, and this required using dualist theory as a complementary theory in this thesis.

2.10.2 The dualist theory

Hart (1973) developed the dualist theory in his study of low-income activities among unskilled migrants from Northern Ghana to the capital city, Accra, who could not find employment. Accra was facing a continuous inflow of laborers migrating from rural areas in search for employment. Most of the migrants could not find formal jobs and eventually sought informal income generating activities. Hence, according to the dualist theory, informality exists due to the inability of the formal sector to generate sufficient job opportunities. Hart (1973) argues that an increase in unemployment leads to an increase in the dependence on survival activities amongst the poor. In contrast, an increase in the availability of formal employment relaxes this dependence. The dualist theory explains why some scholars argue that street vending is due to the unavailability of jobs in the formal sector (Bhowmik, 2005; Forkuor et al., 2017). Thus, the lack of formal jobs pushes individuals into informal activities, including street vending.

According to Hart (1973), the informal economy is condemned to remain an activity of survival for the poor citizens waiting to be integrated into the formal economy. Hence, the dualist theory assumes that the informal economy would disappear as the formal economy expands. Therefore, the theory implies that policies that strive to expand the formal sector and create formal jobs should be encouraged in order to absorb the informal sector, which includes informal workers and informal enterprises (Chen, 2012). Thus, street vending can be limited when the formal sector creates more employment opportunities.

While the dualist theory assumes that workers prefer formal jobs, and only undertake informal work when there is no alternative (Hart, 1973), Maloney (2004) challenges the validity of this notion by arguing that operating in the formal sector is dependent on the appeal of employment within it. If the formal sector is not appealing, then the idea of working in the informal sector as a last resort is undermined because individuals can engage in informal economic activities by choice. Although the dualist and voluntarist theories do not agree on the causes of the informal economy, they both had merit to explain street vendors' views and reactions towards the government's relocation policy. For instance, the dualist theory explains that some individuals engage in street vending due to poverty, low skills, and lack of jobs (Bhowmik, 2005; Hart, 1973). Hence, they have no choice but to disagree with the relocation policy and continue operating informally. In contrast, the voluntarist theory explains that individuals engage in street vending because they opt for the flexibility and entrepreneurship opportunity in the activity (Kusakabe, 2006; Hanewald, 2015; Huang et al., 2017; Mitullah, 2003a). Hence, they choose the extent to which they can agree with the relocation policy based on the opportunities it offers. The choice of combining the voluntarist theory and dualist theory as theories guiding this study was due to the acknowledgement that necessity – in addition to choice – drives informality.

The weakness of the dualist theory was that it only explains why street vending exists but it fails to explain why the relocation policy is ineffective. The dualist theory does not discuss much of the relationship between the informal economy and the formal regulatory environment. However, it was supplemented by the voluntarist theory, which discusses the relationship between the informal economy and the formal regulatory environment, and validly explains why the relocation efforts fail. The voluntarist theory

was used to analyse the extent to which the LCC effectively implements the relocation policy. The LCC aims to repress street vending and make formal markets appealing to street vendors. As shown by the voluntarist theory, the relocation of street vendors to formal markets implies government efforts of repressing street vending and placing them under a formal regulatory environment. Furthermore, it argues that formal markets need to be attractive to repress street vending. The failure to which implies that the street vendors cannot be effectively relocated. Therefore, the study analysed the effectiveness of the street vending relocation policy using the dualist and the voluntarist theories. An analytical approach (see figure 1 below) was developed to facilitate the analysis of the study.




Figure 1: Analytical approach of the study

Figure 1 illustrates the framework used to analyse the effectiveness of the street vending relocation policy. The implementation of the relocation policy rests with local governments. They have the authority to manage street vending in their respective jurisdictions. In this case, the city council provides market infrastructure, sets rules and regulations for vending in the city, and relocates vendors from the streets to formal

markets. Hence, the government expects street vendors to comply with the rules and regulations, and the relocation efforts.

Nonetheless, several factors pull or push individuals into street vending, as explained through the dualist and voluntarist theories. The literature review shows that factors such as unemployment, poverty, level of education, and costly procedures of formality push individuals into street vending. Entrepreneurship and support from the public encourage street vending. These factors negatively affect the relocation policy. Other factors such as politics, the lack of infrastructure, and the lack of street vendors' representation also affect the relocation policy. Therefore, the study sought to analyse the effectiveness of the street vending relocation policy, given the factors that can affect it.

2.11 Conclusion

The chapter has established that the scholarship on the informal sector dates back to the 1950s and 1960s, when it was assumed that informal workers would be absorbed into the modern economy due to industrial growth. However, the assumption was flawed as the informal sector continued to grow and is thriving up-to-date. There are numerous activities in the informal sector. Formalising each of them can take different approaches and it may have different implications because they are not a homogenous group. The review carried out in this chapter focused on the formalisation of street vending, which implies taking street vendors into the formal regulatory environment.

A common approach for the formalisation of street vending in the Global South involves relocating the vendors to formal markets. In Malawi, the implementation of the relocation policy rests with the local government. However, it is not clear why Malawi fails to formalise street vending. Through the lens of the voluntarist theory and the dualist theory, the study sought to reduce the literature gap by analysing the effectiveness of the street vending relocation policy.

CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the methodology used to gather data. The study aimed at analysing the effectiveness of the street vending relocation policy. To fulfil this, it focused on examining the effectiveness of the LCC in implementing the relocation policy. It also explored street vendors' views and reactions towards the relocation policy. This chapter, therefore, presents the research methods employed to achieve the research objectives. It describes and justifies the research design that was adopted. It also justifies the target population and sample size, sampling techniques, data collection methods, and the data analysis techniques that were used.

3.2 Research design

A research design is defined as the planning of scientific inquiry that involves designing a strategy for finding out something (Babbie, 1998). Selecting a research design is one of the most critical initial steps that a researcher needs to undertake. Before embarking on the actual research, one needs to plan what they want to find out and determine how best to go about it. Although there are varying approaches to research design, two are distinctive, and these are the quantitative and qualitative research designs.

This study adopted a mixed (qualitative and quantitative) research design study to corroborate qualitative findings with quantitative ones for greater validity. Schoonenboom and Johnson (2017) defined a mixed methods research design as:

The type of research in which a researcher or team of researchers combines elements of qualitative and quantitative research approaches (such as the use of qualitative and quantitative viewpoints, data collection, analysis, and inference techniques) for breadth and depth of understanding and corroboration. (p.1)

The study involved understanding the effectiveness of the relocation policy from two groups of people—local authorities and street vendors. Hence, the research used qualitative and quantitative methods to ensure that the findings accurately reflect people’s perceptions and avoid biases. Gathering data through one approach can be biased, questionable, and weak. However, collecting information from a variety of sources and with a variety of techniques can confirm findings (Zohrabi, 2013). This study converged views from qualitative and quantitative viewpoints, and secondary sources, which enabled triangulating in on the true result. Therefore, the mixed methods approach helped to increase the validity of the findings.

3.2.1 Qualitative research

The qualitative research is mostly used to find out people’s attitudes, opinions, and behaviours, which cannot be quantified. By using the qualitative method, researchers collect data and explain the phenomena more deeply and exhaustively (Mugenda and Mugenda, 2003). The qualitative approach was necessary for this study because it helped the researcher to capture an in-depth understanding of the implementation of the relocation policy and street vendors’ views and reactions towards it.

3.2.2 Quantitative research

The quantitative approach is defined as a research strategy that emphasises ‘quantification’ in the collection and analysis of data (Bryman, 2012, p. 35). This approach focuses on aspects of social behaviour that can be quantified, rather than interpreting the meanings people bring to their action (Rahman, 2017). Thus, quantitative research conducts the inquiry in an unbiased and objective manner, collects quantifiable data from participants (usually large numbers); and analyses these numbers using statistical techniques (Rahman, 2017). Since quantitative studies involve a large sample, they are likely to be generalised to a whole population or a subpopulation. Some questions in this study required using quantitative measures that can be generalised to the entire population. For instance, analysing the effectiveness of the relocation policy required knowing the percentage of street vendors that would agree to operate formally and to find out the most cited problems associated with relocation.

3.2.3 Mixed method research

Mixed methods research is defined as a method and philosophy that attempts to bring together the perceptions provided by qualitative and quantitative research into a workable solution (Schoonenboom and Johnson, 2017). One of the major reasons for using the mixed methods approach is that it helps to improve communication among researchers from different models as they attempt to advance knowledge (Maxcy, 2003).

This study used mixed methods research through semi-structured interviews (SSIs) with key informants and focus group discussions (FGDs) and questionnaires administered to street vendors. This method was unlike Chinsinga and Kayuni (2011) who made a similar study on analysing the feasibility of formalising street vending through qualitative methods alone. Their research did not interview the street vendors individually, and that makes it more difficult to generalise their findings. Findings from a qualitative approach can hardly be generalised unlike a quantitative approach. However, to the extent that data from the two approaches converges on a common pattern or result, its generalisability increases (Abowitz and Toole, 2010). Hence, the use of different approaches had the potential of providing a greater depth and breadth of information, which was not going to be possible by utilising singular approaches in isolation (Almalki, 2016). Therefore, the mixed method approach made it possible to generalise the findings in this study to similar contexts and subjects.

Using the mixed methods approach was also crucial for this study because it gave the researcher a chance to use both words and numbers to answer the research questions. Although this approach was time-consuming, it, however, allowed the study to have an informed discussion from the data generated by both quantitative and qualitative methods. In addition, the use of the quantitative measures helped to check uniformity in the data collected from FGDs and SSIs. According to Schoonenboom and Johnson (2017), triangulation refers to the view of combining quantitative and qualitative research, and secondary sources in order to corroborate the findings. Hence, this study validated the qualitative findings with quantitative ones.

3.3 Case study area

The study was conducted in Lilongwe, Malawi's capital. The justification for choosing this as the study area was, firstly, due to the extent of the street vending problem in Lilongwe city. While street vending exists in the major cities of Malawi, Lilongwe had a compelling case due to claims by formal market vendors that the LCC fails to relocate street vendors. For instance, Boyen (2014) notes that formal market vendors chased away the street vendors in 2013 because the city council had failed to relocate them. In addition, Sabola's (2019) media report shows that formal market vendors organised demonstrations and called upon the city council to stop tolerating street vending. These instances show that the city council was failing to contain the street vendors; hence, the study had to analyse the effectiveness of the street vending relocation policy in Lilongwe.

Secondly, one can expect overpopulation in Lilongwe and migrations of the urban poor in search of a better life, and street vending interacts directly with these problems. According to Nchito (2011), street vendors are attracted to areas with high populations because they need a high volume of sales. Thus, Lilongwe being an area that attracts street vendors, presented an excellent opportunity for the study.

Lilongwe has two main business centres, commonly known as Old Town and City Centre. The Old Town contains markets, shops, hotels, and restaurants and is a thriving commercial area primarily visited by locals (LCA, 2009). Whereas, the City Centre is a more developed area that mostly hosts offices. The study was conducted in both areas because these locations have formal markets for vending and yet relocating the street vendors to the markets was still ineffective (Ngwira, 2019).

3.4 Population

A population is an entire group of individuals, events, or objects with some common observable characteristics (Mugenda and Mugenda, 2003). Issues of the population are critical as they provide direction of the sample size to be used in the study. This study targeted individuals and the institution directly involved in the process of relocating street vendors. It targeted and benefitted from the voices of individuals from the LCC and the street vendors in Lilongwe.

3.5 Sampling techniques and sample size

Kumar (2011) defines sampling as a process of selecting units, people, or organisations from a population of interest so that results can be generalised back to the population from which they were chosen.

In many studies, factors such as lack of human resources, lack of precision, high expenses, inadequate equipment, and population dispersion prevent researchers from studying the entire population (Ahmadzadehasl and Ariasepehr, 2010). It is of the same reasons that this study could not interview every street vendor, and every city council official, hence, it had to select a sample. This study, therefore, employed non-probability sampling techniques called purposive and snowball.

3.5.1 Sample size

The study sampled 384 street vendors. The selection of this sample size was based on Cochran's (1963) formula for calculating a sample size when the total population is unknown. The total number of street vendors in Lilongwe was not known. This formula allows one to calculate an ideal sample size given a desired level of precision (margin of error), desired confidence level, and the estimated proportion of the attribute present in the population (degree of variability). According to Taherdoost (2017), a 95% confidence level (Z value of 1.96) and a 5% level of precision is acceptable in social research and thus adopted in this study. According to Bartlett, Kotrlik, and Higgins (2001), researchers should use 50% (0.5) as an estimate of the degree of variability when true variability of the proportion attribute is unknown. A proportion of 0.5 indicates the maximum variability in the proportion and produces the maximum sample size. Since street vendors' views regarding the relocation policy were unknown, the estimated degree of variability was at 0.5. The equation below demonstrates the resulting sample size of street vendors where p is 0.5, q is 1-p, Z is 1.96, and E is 0.05.

$$n = \frac{Z^2 pq}{E^2} = \frac{1.96^2 (0.5)(0.5)}{(0.05)^2} = 384$$

The study also sampled three key informants and four FGDs. The concept of data saturation was the basis for selecting the sample sizes for both key informants and FGDs. According to Polit and Beck (2006), qualitative researchers' sampling decisions

are guided by the principle of data saturation. Data saturation occurs when the information becomes repetitive and redundant such that no new information can be obtained by further data collection. Therefore, the sample size for the qualitative tools in this study was determined when no new information was gained from the interviews.

3.5.2 Purposive sampling

Purposive sampling is a non-probability sampling technique where the researcher selects a sample for observations that he or she believes will yield the most comprehensive information (Rubin and Babbie, 1997). According to O’Leary (2010), it involves the selection of a sample ‘with a particular purpose in mind’ (p.170). The researcher concentrates on people with particular characteristics who in a better position to facilitate the success of a study.

The purposive sampling method was used to sample street vendors. Firstly, they were selected because one of the specific objectives of the study involved exploring their views on the relocation policy. Secondly, the relocation policy directly affects them, and they were in an excellent position to provide quantitative data on the effectiveness of the LCC in relocating street vendors. Therefore, the selection of the street vendors to be interviewed using questionnaires was based on a purposive sampling method.

The purposive sampling method was also used to identify street vendors to participate in FGDs. The selection of the street vendors to participate in FGDs was based on their knowledge and experiences on the subject matter; specifically, the study sought to explore street vendors’ views and reactions towards the relocation policy.

3.5.3 Snowball sampling methods

Snowball sampling is defined as the process of selecting a sample using networks (Kumar, 2011). The researcher selects one or a few individuals in a group or organisation and relies on these individuals for referrals to other significant individuals. The newly identified individuals become the basis for additional participants, and the process continues until a saturation point.

This study sampled key informants using the snowball sampling method. It enabled the researcher to identify and to choose participants with in-depth knowledge about the

implementation of the street vending relocation policy. Hence, the study interviewed officials from the LCC. Specifically, the researcher interviewed key informants from the department of commerce and trade at the LCC. One of the responsibilities of this department is to implement vending rules and regulations, including those for street vending. Hence, they are responsible for ensuring that there is no street vending.

According to Naderifar, Goli, and Ghaljaie (2017), the snowball sampling method is efficient and cost-effective to access people who would otherwise be very difficult to find. Upon requesting to conduct the study at the council, the administration recommended interviewing the director of trade and commerce because his department implements the street vending relocation policy. The recommendation served as the starting point that led to two more referrals. This sampling method was useful for this study because the researcher was not very familiar with who was necessary at the city council. Thus, the snowball sampling technique made it much more comfortable and useful for the researcher to carry out the data collection. It also made it easier for the researcher to sample people with similar experiences as the director of trade and commerce to take part in the study. Similar to the views of Naderifar et al. (2017), the snowball sampling method provided the researcher with the opportunity to communicate better with the samples, as they were acquaintances of the first sample.

3.6 Data collection methods

The study used primary and secondary data. Primary data was collected through semi-structured interviews (SSI), questionnaires, and focus group discussions (FGDs) (see appendix 1, 2, and 3). The secondary data was used by reviewing literature that helped to answer the research objectives.

3.6.1 Semi-structured interviews

A semi-structured interview is a flexible interview in which the interviewer does not follow a formalised list of questions. Instead, it has a list of general topics called an interview guide (Kumar, 2011). Putting into consideration the research questions and information required, SSIs were conducted with key informants as the primary research method for their data generation. The advantage of SSIs is that it enables the interviewer to probe and establish a conversational style with the respondent (Patton, 2002).

The justification for employing this technique was that the researcher had open-ended questions to have room for debate, and structured interviews could not have given such an advantage. The nature of this qualitative set of SSIs allowed the researcher to probe and understand the detailed information about the street vending relocation policy.

3.6.2 Questionnaire

This study collected data from 384 street vendors by administering questionnaires with both open-ended and close-ended questions. A questionnaire is a written list of questions with a choice of answers that are recorded by respondents (Kumar, 2011). The respondents read the questions, interpret what is expected, and then write down the answers. However, this study used interviewer-administered questionnaires where each respondent was asked the same questions and their responses recorded by the interviewer.

The questionnaire was used in this study as it was the least-cost research strategy, which, according to Fowler (2013), enables the researcher to collect large amounts of data over a short period. The demerits of interviewer-administered questionnaires are that the personal characteristics of the interviewers, such as level of experience, can affect the response rates and the nature of responses. Interviewers can introduce errors by changing the wording of the questions and by the selective recording of answers. However, this study made an effort to avoid such mistakes by training the interviewers before commencing the data collection task.

3.6.3 Focus group discussions

The study conducted four FGDs to obtain detailed information about personal and group feelings and perceptions of street vendors. An FGD involves a group of people with similar characteristics that gather to discuss a specific topic of interest. A moderator who introduces topics for discussion and helps the group to participate in a lively and natural manner guides the discussions.

The study deliberately chose FGDs because they ensure efficiency whereby the researcher can gather information about several people in one session. Secondly, FGDs provide quality controls because participants tend to provide checks and balances on

one another. It also gives room to gather as much information as possible without restricting the respondents.

3.6.4 Documents

This study reviewed various literature related to street vending and the relocation of street vendors. Several authors (Chisinga and Kayuni, 2011; Jongh, 2015; Kayuni and Tambulasi, 2009) have written about street vending in Malawi. Hence, reviewing their journal articles provided a thorough understanding of the topic under study, and it helped to explain and compare the research findings with the previous studies. The study also used media reports (Bisani, 2017; Ngwira, 2019; Sabola, 2019) to substantiate responses on the effectiveness of the LCC in relocating street vendors. The issues concerning street vending in Malawi tend to be reported in the media. Therefore, reviewing such documents helped to support the primary data.

3.7 Data analysis

The study used content analysis for analysing qualitative data. The content analysis involves analysing the contents of documentary materials such as books, magazines, newspapers, and the contents of all other verbal materials, spoken or printed (Kothari, 2004). According to Trace (2001), content analysis is generally applied to narrative texts such as speeches, transcribed interviews, and published literature. It seeks to elucidate, through close examination of the content and language of these texts, what can be learned about the author's or respondent's understanding of phenomena, terminology, and beliefs. Thus, the content analysis involved systematically classifying words, phrases, sentences, and other units of text into a series of meaningful categories.

Content analysis was appropriate for this study because qualitative data required coding and categorising into themes so that the researcher came up with conclusions. Notes taken during fieldwork and secondary data were also analysed using content analysis.

The quantitative data was analysed using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). The data was first entered in Excel and then transferred to SPSS for coding and labelling. The data was then analysed in SPSS using descriptive statistics. It involved generating frequencies to analyse categorical responses from street vendors, including their reasons for engaging in street vending. It also involved analysing categorical

responses of how street vendors perceived the effectiveness of the LCC in relocating them. In addition, cross-tabulations were also used to explain the responses of different categories of respondents. For instance, cross-tabulations were used to describe the various reasons for mobile and fixed street vendors' reactions towards relocation.

3.8 Ethical considerations

Ethics refers to a system of moral values concerned with the degree to which research adheres to a professional, legal, and social obligation to the study (Mertens and Grinsberg, 2008). In addition, Homan (1998) argues that social research must strive to protect subjects from undue harm arising because they participated in the study. Ethical issues are critical in social research because if they are not adequately adhered to, they can negatively affect or even change the outcomes of the research study.

At the beginning of the data collection, the researcher acquired an introductory letter from Chancellor College to assure the participants that the study was for academic purposes (see Appendix 4). The Lilongwe City Council also permitted to conduct the research (see Appendix 5).

Another aspect that was important in this study was the issue of informed consent. It involved informing prospective research participants about the procedures and risks involved in the research and gaining their approval to participate. Therefore, the study sought permission from the participants to take part in the study. This research had also put into consideration the issue of voluntary participation. Voluntary participation required that people should participate in the study without being coerced. The study respected the wishes of participants who chose not to participate. While some of the street vendors were convinced that the research was for academic purposes, others were afraid to talk because they suspected it was a study by the government. Therefore, only the individuals who gave their consent participated in the study.

3.9 Limitations of the study

The first limitation of the study is the timing of the research itself. The study was done during a short period due to delays that took place during the time the researcher was writing the research proposal. Data collection took place during December 2019. The

researcher had to ensure that data was collected before the Christmas holidays to allow for the key informants' participation in the study.

Secondly, the researcher had no control over the selection of key informants because they were recommendations. It was a challenge because the second key informant recommended an individual who did not respond to some of the questions. The problem could be because he worked for less than a year at the time of the interview. However, the study made use of some of the responses despite that he could not respond to other questions.

The third limitation was that it was challenging to interview street vendors that were not stationary. Most street vendors were mobile either because they were on the lookout of police or because of the nature of their job. Hence, it was difficult for them to create some time to sit and talk. In addition, some of the street vendors were not willing to talk because they suspected that the local authorities would use the information. However, the study overcame this limitation by approaching street vendors that were willing to participate and assuring them that the research was for academic purposes only.

Lastly, the study did not include formal market traders in its study population. It would have been more interesting for the study to include the perspective of formal market traders in its analysis of the effectiveness of the relocation policy. The formal market traders are informal entrepreneurs who choose to comply with the policy and it would have been beneficial for the study to understand the benefits of operating under the formal regulatory environment from their perspective. Nonetheless, the study managed to answer the research questions by collecting primary data from key informants and street vendors. The key informants mainly represented the policy implementers and the street vendors represented individuals who operate informally and opt not to comply with the policy. Hence, the study managed to examine the effectiveness of the LCC in implementing the relocation policy and it managed to explore street vendors' views and reactions towards the policy.

3.10 Conclusion

The chapter has outlined the rationality behind the research methods used in this study. The study involved analysing the effectiveness of the LCC in implementing the relocation policy and it gained valuable insight from key informants who are responsible for the implementation of the policy. The study also required exploring street vendors views towards the relocation policy; hence, it collected data from street vendors since the policy directly affects them and they have shown non-compliance towards it. The adoption of a mixed research design provided a robust means of answering the research questions because the collection and analysis of qualitative and quantitative data helped to validate the research findings. The study also used secondary data from journal articles and media reports as a triangulation method to substantiate responses on the effectiveness of the LCC in relocating street vendors.

CHAPTER FOUR

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents responses given by participants in order to analyse the effectiveness of the street vending relocation policy in Malawi. Based on the research objectives, this chapter discusses the effectiveness of the LCC in implementing the relocation policy. It also discusses street vendors' views and reactions towards the relocation policy. The chapter has been categorised into several sections according to the research objectives. The findings in each section are discussed with the empirical and theoretical literature that inform this study.

4.2 Socio-economic profile of street vendors

This profile provides data concerning the 384 survey participants. An analysis of the socio-economic profile of respondents is crucial in social science investigations because it enables understanding factors that affect their value system (Liya, 2015). The socio-economic background of street vendors has the potential to drive them directly or indirectly into the informal sector. Generally, street vendors are characterised by a low level of income, lack of skill or education, and self-employment (Chakraborty and Koley, 2018). Hence, through the analysis of their socio-economic background, we can comprehend their way of life and some factors that drive them to engage in street vending activities. Therefore, this section presents the socio-economic profile of street vendors, including age and sex of respondents, source of income, type of employment, and level of education.

4.2.1 Age and sex

To begin with, the largest age group of street vendors (43%) was between 26 to 35 years. The second-largest age group (38%) was between 19 to 25 years. The remaining age groups of 18 years and below, 35 to 45 years, represents 7% and 9% of the street

vendors, respectively. Street vendors aged 46 and above represent 3% (see figure 2 below).




Figure 2: Age groups of the respondents

The Malawi National Youth Policy (2013) defines the youth as people aged between 10 to 35 years. Figure 2 shows that over 80% of the street vendors are individuals under 35 years of age. Hence, the youth dominate street vending in Lilongwe. One possible explanation for this is that the youth are more energetic and are more able to respond to evictions and harassment when they occur, as compared to older people. The harassment of street vendors by state officials is pervasive as legislation in many countries forbids street vending. For instance, Uwitije (2016) notes that street vendors in Kigali, are continuously on the run due to local authorities' evictions and confiscation of goods. Street vendors in Malawi also face similar harassment. According to Bisani's (2017) media report, street vendors are always alert. They fear of encountering police officers or city council officials, who can arrest, solicit a bribe or confiscate their goods.

The sample had more males (62.3%) than females (37.7%). Contrary to Kusakabe's (2006) findings, which show that women dominate street vending, this study found that men dominate it. The study attempted to ensure gender balance in the selection of the sample; however, it found that there were more male street vendors than females. Chinsinga and Kayuni (2011) also note that males dominate the vending community in Malawi.

4.2.2 Type of employment

Malawi has both mobile and stationary street vendors (Jongh, 2015). The study found that the majority of street vendors (63.9%) were mobile. According to Steel, Ujoranyi, and Owusu (2014), street vending favours mobile street vendors because of the risk of confiscations. Mobile street vendors are in a better position to avoid evictions and confiscations. They do not remain in one area, and they can quickly run with their goods.

Most of the street vendors (84.7%) are self-employed. While the informal economy contains wage-employed and self-employed workers (Chen, 2007), the latter appears to dominate the street vending business. According to the dualist theory, informal economic activities, including street vending, are what individuals do for themselves beyond state regulation (Hart, 1973). Most of the global workforce (60%) is in the informal sector due to the inability of the formal sector to generate sufficient job opportunities (ILO, 2018). Hence, the findings in this study agree with the dualist theory because it is expected that individuals employ themselves when the state fails to intervene. Nonetheless, there are several reasons individuals choose the street vending business, including wanting to enjoy the flexibility of being self-employed (Hanewald, 2015; Huang et al., 2017). Street vending also requires a low initial investment, and the findings in this study show that many people can easily employ themselves.

4.2.3 Source of income

The study found that 79% of the street vendors rely solely on the street vending business as their source of income. Mahzambe (2017) similarly found that the majority (86.6%) of street vendors in Zimbabwe depended entirely on street vending as their source of income. Hence, street vending aids most individuals who do not have other options. Global literature on street vending shows that, in some instances, individuals find

informal work attractive and hence decide to become street vendors (Kusakabe, 2006). In some other cases, socio-economic forces push individuals into becoming street vendors (Brown et al., 2017). Figure 3 below shows the reasons people decided to join the street vending business.




Figure 3: Reasons for joining the street vending business

More than half (54%) of the street vendors' responses were that they started street vending because it is their only option, and they do not have alternatives. Other reasons stated were difficulties in finding salaried jobs (38%), costs of operating formally (7.3%), and poverty (3.2%). They also mentioned easy accessibility to customers (25.5%), more flexibility than working in formal markets (12.5%), less competition than operating in formal markets (3.6%), and easy means of setting oneself up (1.6%). The study deduced these responses to two major reasons for joining street vending. The first major reason involves socio-economic forces pushing individuals into street vending. The data in figure 3 shows that individuals joined street vending because it was inevitable. Hence, street vending becomes unavoidable because the individuals have no alternatives but to become street vendors. The second major reason for joining street vending is due to individuals' rational choice (Maloney, 2004). The data in figure

3 shows that individuals find it better to operate as street vendors because they have less competition than formal market traders. They can also access more customers than formal market traders. In addition, they find it easy to set themselves up as street vendors as it is more costly to operate in formal markets. They also find street vending more flexible than operating in formal markets.

The two major reasons for joining street vending could be explained with the dualist and the voluntarist theories. According to the voluntarist theory, street vendors choose to operate informally because the benefits outweigh the costs (Maloney, 2004). Hence, some of the data shows that individuals start the street vending business due to their rational choice. Street vendors make a rational choice to start street vending because of the benefits they can gain from it, including the easy accessibility of customers. According to the dualist theory (Hart, 1973), poverty and the lack of formal jobs pushes individuals into street vending. Hence, individuals join street vending because they have no other choice, and it is inevitable. Therefore, both the dualist and voluntarist theories help to explain individuals' reasons for joining street vending.

4.2.4 Level of education

The survey found that 53.4% and 41.8% of street vendors managed to go to secondary school and primary school, respectively. Only 4.9% had no formal education, and none of the surveyed street vendors had tertiary education. Ndhlovu's study (2011) showed that it is more difficult for individuals at the primary school level to get a formal job than those who had at least a secondary education. Nonetheless, figure 4 below shows that about half (94 out of 198) of the street vendors with secondary school education cited the difficulty to find waged jobs as one of the main reasons for street vending compared to one-third (52 out of 155) of the street vendors with primary school education. Therefore, this is contrary to Ndhlovu's argument because the study found more street vendors with secondary education who saw it challenging to find waged jobs.




Figure 4: Cross-tabulation of street vendors' level of education and difficulty to find waged jobs

Similar to the findings in this study, Hart (1973) argued that middle-school leavers in the Ghanaian urban labour market found their qualifications inadequate for formal jobs. Hence, they competed with illiterates in the informal sector. Therefore, individuals who have acquired some basic education find it just as challenging to find jobs in the formal sector. Street vending is an option for them despite their levels of education.

4.3 Examining the extent the LCC effectively implements the relocation policy

The information concerning the LCC's strategies for implementing the relocation policy emerged from the interviews with key informants. The study tested the effectiveness of the implementation of the policy by asking the key informants whether they meet their objectives. Furthermore, it asked street vendors, through FGDs and questionnaires, whether the government strategies convince them to relocate.

In order to get a clear picture of the relocation policy, the study asked key informants to explain what they consider as street vending and how they respond to it. Table 2 below shows the key informants' definitions of street vending.

Table 2: Definitions of street vending

Key informant	Definition of street vending
Key informant 1	It means selling on the streets without a permit.
Key informant 2	Street vending is selling outside the designated areas or markets.
Key informant 3	These are business establishments found on the streets.

Based on the key informants' definitions, street vending is an activity that occurs when people decide to establish businesses on the streets and outside the designated areas or markets. This is akin to the definitions of street vending commonly used in literature (Bhowmik, 2005; Bromley, 2000; Mitullah, 2004). Bromley (2000) defines it as the sale of goods and services 'in streets and other related public axes' (p.1). Bhowmik (2005) also describes a street vendor as a person 'trading from the street' without a permanent structure from which to sell (p. 2256). Therefore, the definition of street vending found in literature applies to how the key informants described it.

In many countries, policy on street vendors involves the control of their presence in public places, and the government classifies places that can operate as selling sites (Hermawati, 2017). Similarly, this study found that the government wants to control the number of street vendors found in public places. According to the key informants, the Malawi government policy towards street vending is to relocate vendors from the streets and place them in areas designated for vending. This approach is similar to one of the policy approaches towards street vending that is recommended by the voluntarist theory, which includes limiting the number of street vendors by confining the activity to formal markets (Maloney, 2004). According to Lilongwe city council by-laws, vending is supposed to take place in designated areas (LCA, 2002). The Lilongwe Old Town and City Centre have four markets where vendors can operate. The Lilongwe Old Town has a total of three, namely: Area 3 Market, Central Market, and Tsoka Flea Market. City Centre has one market called Area 13 Market. The government policy towards street vending is to relocate the street vendors, and the four markets are among the areas where the LCC expects vendors to operate.

From 2006, the Malawi government had started implementing the relocation policy. The beginning of implementation was marked by the late President Bingu wa Mutharika's mobilisation of the police and army to chase away the street vendors (Kayuni and Tambulasi, 2009). Since then, the implementation has mainly been in the hands of city authorities. It is not surprising because decentralisation gives local authorities the power to regulate the areas within their jurisdiction (Batr  au and Bonnet, 2015). Although policies are designed at the national level, they are generally implemented at the local level. However, the local authorities only take control over street vending after the central government decides the direction to take on the street vending policy. Evidence from Malawi supports this claim as Bakili Muluzi supported street vending, and the local government could not take control of street vending regulation during his reign. The local government began taking control of street vending regulation during the reign of late president Bingu wa Mutharika. He had shown that he was against street vending by ordering the removal of street vendors.

According to the Lilongwe city authorities, their main strategy of relocating street vendors is with a city patrol. The city patrol goes around the streets in the urban areas of Lilongwe, chasing, making arrests, and confiscating goods of street vendors. All three key informants confirmed that their only objective is to make sure that no one establishes a street vending business without authorisation from the city council. The study weighed the expected outcomes against the results of the implementation to measure the effectiveness of using the city patrol. As a general matter, the effectiveness of public policies can be defined as the extent to which the policy achieves what it is supposed to accomplish (Nagel, 1986). Table 3 below presents a summary of the expectations and outcomes of the relocation policy based on key informants' responses.

Table 3: Expectations and outcomes of the relocation policy

Key informant	Expectation	Outcome
Key informant 1	They expect not to see street vendors	There has been massive resistance towards the LCC's implementation.
Key informant 2	They expect no street vendors on the streets due to the imposed K5, 000 (6.8 USD) fine.	Resistance and street vendors have adapted to the enforcement.
Key informant 3	They expect the cessation of street vending	The number of street vendors is increasing.

The local authorities do not expect to see street vendors due to the implementation of the relocation policy. Street vendors risk confiscation of their goods, arrests, and paying a fine of K5, 000 (6.8 USD) when caught by the city patrol. Hence, the local authorities expect street vendors to fear the penalties imposed for violating the law. The authorities in several cities of the world have been chasing, evicting, and arresting street vendors. It is a deliberate strategy to repress street vending. These policies of repressing street vending are common worldwide. Roever and Skinner (2016) report that over three years, more than 50 evictions of street vendors were reported in cities across the Global South, including Bogotá, Mexico City, Cairo, Lagos, and Harare.

The use of a city patrol to evict street vendors is in line with voluntarist policies towards street vending. Apart from providing street vendors with alternatives, the voluntarist policies also aim to repress street vending through the enforcement of prohibitive laws and punishments for infringing the law (Hernández, 2017). The purpose of the punitive measures is to reduce the attractiveness of informality in order for the vendors to opt for formal ways of conducting business. Hence, the authorities try to suppress street vending by putting in place penalties for non-compliance. Nonetheless, the key informants acknowledged that there had been resistance from street vendors, and the LCC fails to contain street vending. Similarly, 93% of street vendors mentioned that the prevalence of street vending is high. The FGDs also revealed that there are currently

more street vendors in Lilongwe compared to three years ago. For instance, it transpired in one of the FGDs that:

The current situation is different compared to three years ago. Currently, we find three people selling tomato at the same spot, and this was not happening three years ago. It shows that the number of street vendors is on the rise.

Street vendors frequently complain about relocating to other areas because the alternatives fall short of their expectations (Mramba, 2015; Nakazi and Marrion, 2019; Ndhlovu, 2011), and the LCC faces a similar challenge. For instance, Mramba (2015) notes that the government of Tanzania built a complex that could accommodate 10,000 street vendors in Dar-es-Salam. However, street vendors refused to use it. Among other reasons, the street vendors found the building inaccessible to customers, and the rent was high. Similarly, figure 5 below shows that 84.6% of the street vendors confirmed that street vending is not being contained.

Figure 5 shows a cross-tabulation of whether street vending is contained and an explanation of the responses. Most (84%) of the street vendors said that it not contained. They highlighted that it is due to their dissatisfaction with the alternatives. For instance, 34.4% and 8 % of them said the relocation efforts do not provide alternatives, and there are no market structures to accommodate all of them, respectively. According to the voluntarist theory, apart from suppressing street vending, an effective government policy would require providing alternatives that can attract street vendors. The street vendors are considered as rational agents who choose the options that provide better satisfaction to them (Maloney, 2004). Even if the government tries to decrease the utility that can be gained from informality, it would still have to provide alternatives that can give better satisfaction to the vendors for them to be convinced to operate in the formal markets. Therefore, the lack of suitable alternatives means that vendors will continue to operate roadside.




Figure 5: Crosstabulation of the containment of street vending and explanations

The study found that several factors make the relocation efforts ineffective. Firstly, political interference hinders the city patrol’s task. Secondly, the unavailability of resources, including vehicles and personnel, negatively affects the implementation of the policy. Thirdly, the lack of infrastructure and alternative spaces for vending fuels street vending. The lack of representation of street vendors also affects the effectiveness of relocation efforts. The following is a discussion of how these factors affect the effectiveness of the LCC in relocating street vendors.

4.3.1 Political interference

The study found that politics plays a major role in the implementation of the relocation policy. Key informants mentioned that they stopped implementing the relocation policy. One of the key informants also argued that ‘they are not to blame for failing to contain the street vending problem because the implementation of the programme is not free from political interference.’ Similarly, another key informant mentioned that the council fails to implement the policy during election periods because incumbent politicians instruct against it. He argued that the local authorities do not have power

over politicians, and ‘street vendors reach the extent of selling outside the city council without anyone taking action against them.’ The key informants’ responses imply that the local authorities only implement the relocation policy when ordered by the central government. The LCC did not effectively relocate street vendors in 2019. The survey data revealed that only 35% of the street vendors faced eviction in 2019, and the rest (65%) were either last evicted in 2017 or 2018 (see figure 6 below).




Figure 6: The last time street vendors faced eviction

Despite local governments having the authority to implement policies (Batréau and Bonnet, 2015), the findings in this study show that implementation is only possible with support from the central government. These findings are similar to observations made by some scholars that street vending only becomes unacceptable when the central government opposes it (Nchito, 2011; Ndhlovu, 2011). According to a media report (Sabola, 2019), the LCC was willing to continue implementing the relocation policy. However, the minister of local government ordered them not to. Hence, political interference undermines the efforts of relocating street vendors because the council neglects law enforcement to satisfy political interests.

The study also found that the LCC did not continue evicting street vendors after the general elections in May 2019. The election results were contested in court, and it

generated public defiance towards some law enforcers, including the police. Key informants described the situation after the elections as hostile, and they had to stop implementation of the policy. According to one key informant:

The implementation of the policy was paused due to the political situation in the country. The town rangers were moving with the police. Hence, political uncertainty after elections meant that the police could not work with the town rangers without risking riots.

Literature shows that politics is often a setback to relocation efforts (Nchito, 2011; Ndhlovu, 2011; Young, 2018). For instance, Ndhlovu (2011) conducted a study on street vending in Lusaka during an election period and found that the situation of street vending had worsened. She discovered that politicians relaxed the law enforcement on street vendors for fear of losing votes. Similarly, street vendors in Lilongwe also take advantage of the political interests and maximise the benefits of selling from the streets. FGDs with street vendors revealed that the city patrol had stopped evicting the street vendors a few months before the May 21, 2019, tripartite elections. It gave most of them the confidence to continue operating on the streets. In addition, it transpired that the street vendors work with no worries of evictions in an election year as political influence usually protects them. Political interference weakens local authorities' powers because they cannot make decisions on street vending independently. The voluntarist theory maintains that government intervention has an impact on the costs and benefits of informal and formal activities (Maloney, 2004), which affects street vendors' trade-off decisions between operating informally and in the formal environment. Hence, street vendors do not consider informality costly when the government stops enforcing the law against street vending. Rather, it becomes an opportunity for them to maximise the benefits of operating informally. Therefore, politics is a challenge to relocating street vendors because implementation stops when approaching elections.

Politicians are more interested in political survival than the regulation of street vending. Without the political interest of survival, the LCC would be able to implement the relocation policy without interference. Young's (2018) article titled 'De-democratisation and the rights of street vendors in Kampala' shows how street vending flourishes with political influence and dies when the political space is closed. The

Ugandan central government closed the political space when it decided to use appointed technocrats instead of locally elected politicians to implement policies at the Kampala City Council. Hence, street vending flourished in Kampala before the appointment of technocrats because local level politicians sought votes from street vendors. Similarly, Kayuni and Tambulasi (2009) note that the relocation of street vendors was successful in Malawi in 2006 because there were no local-level politicians and technocrats ran the councils. Therefore, effective implementation of the relocation policy would require limiting political interference and giving more powers to the LCC.

4.3.2 Lack of infrastructure

The provision of infrastructure is one of the ways to ensure that street vendors have alternative spaces to operate from (Ferragut and Gomez, 2013). The lack of sufficient spaces and infrastructure for street vendors is one of the problems that fuel street vending. The key informants acknowledged that insufficient formal markets are a challenge to the relocation of street vendors in Lilongwe. The LCC only has four formal markets, and they are not enough to accommodate the street vendors. One of the key informants mentioned that the council fails to establish markets in more desired areas. He argued that most land is in possession of other authorities, including the Ministry of Lands. Street vendors also complain that there are no formal markets to accommodate them. For instance, participants in one of the FGDs argued that:

Street vending relocation would be viable if there were good markets. Good markets have less competition, enough space to accommodate the vendors and attract customers. However, the government does not give us good markets, and we have no choice but to continue with street vending.

Although the provision of infrastructure is necessary to give street vendors alternatives (Ferragut and Gomez, 2013), it is not assured that they will occupy them. The other options provided need to be attractive to street vendors. For instance, Uwitije (2016) argues that street vendors in Kigali would be willing to move to alternative spaces if the said areas were easily accessible and attracted customers. Similarly, Chinsinga and Kayuni (2011) found that street vendors in Malawi prefer relocating to markets that are easily accessible by customers. When the formal markets are poorly located, customers end up buying from street vendors because of their convenience. Thus, the streets are a convenient location for customers, and this attracts more street vendors. The LCC does

not provide street vendors with viable or good alternatives after the evictions, and this fosters their non-compliance with relocation. Therefore, apart from the provision of infrastructure, accessibility, and attractiveness of the markets are important to relocate street vendors effectively.

In addition to the FGDs, the survey with street vendors revealed that 71% were not satisfied with the flea markets. Figure 7 below shows the reasons for their dissatisfaction, and the most mentioned (86%) was that the markets do not have space to accommodate them.




Figure 7: The reasons for street vendors' dissatisfaction with formal markets

The findings in figure 7 above agree with some scholars who argue that failure to provide street vendors with alternatives after evictions will lead to their return to the streets (Ferragut and Gomez, 2013; Nchito, 2011; Uwitije, 2016). For instance, Nchito (2011) argues that street vendors who fail to access formal market infrastructure find it justified to remain on the streets. Hence, the effectiveness of relocating street vendors depends on the alternatives given to street vendors. According to the voluntarist theory, if relocation is to work, the markets should provide better opportunities relative to operating from the streets. The voluntarist theory is of the view that vendors make a rational choice to run either legally or illegally. Relocating street vendors would be

effective if the formal markets had more benefits than operating illegally. Therefore, the LCC does not implement the relocation policy effectively because it fails to provide street vendors with better formal market infrastructure.

4.3.3 Unavailability of resources

The availability of resources affects the effectiveness of the LCC in relocating street vendors. The interviews with key informants revealed that the city council lacks resources to support the task of the city patrol; hence, the deployment of officers depends on the availability of resources. All the key informants failed to mention the frequency of the deployment of the city patrol officers because it is not fixed. Despite their failure to provide this information, the study managed to estimate by asking street vendors, through questionnaires, the number of times the city patrol evicted them in the last 12 months. Thus, it was revealed that 76.6% were evicted once, 4.7% twice, and 18.8% thrice in 2019. It implies that the council evicted street vendors at least three times in 2019. To some extent, evicting street vendors depends on the availability of resources. It transpired in one of the key informant interviews that the LCC does not have vehicles for the task because they use the same vehicles for other duties. Another key informant confirmed this by arguing that:

Apart from vehicles, the issue of human resources is a drawback to the task of the city patrol. A task force patrols the city, but it is not enough to get the job done. The council lacks the workforce to make sure that the policy is effectively implemented. Currently, the council has outsourced a security company to help the city patrol in the enforcement of street vending laws.

From the key informants' responses, it shows that the city council lacks resources that would enable the city patrol to operate effectively. The points raised by the key informants agree with Ndhlovu's (2011) argument that local councils need funds to execute their operations in law enforcement. She notes that the central government gave resources to the Lusaka city council in 2009 to get rid of street vendors. However, it was too costly for them to sustain the operation because they had to hire police officers to help chase the street vendors. Similarly, Ngwira (2019) reported that council officials in Malawi find the implementation of the relocation policy economically challenging because they hire police officers to help chase away street vendors. Therefore, the lack

of resources limits the effective implementation of the relocation policy, and this is one of the problems faced by the LCC.

4.3.4 Lack of street vendors' representation

Street vendors need to be organised to be able to negotiate with the government on decisions or policies that concern them (Mitullah, 2003a). A street vendor organisation acts as a governance institution that can better negotiate for a better market plan and convince its members to conform to the public market plan. Hence, the street vendor organisations need to be strong in terms of representation and capability for effective negotiation. The robustness of a street vendor organisation motivates street vendors to be more willing to commit themselves to act together and contribute to the success of the street vending relocation process (Weng and Kim, 2016). However, Skinner (2008a) notes that it is challenging for street vendors to have a collective voice. They do not belong to any organisation, unlike their counterparts in formal markets. The findings in this study show that street vendors are unorganised and do not have representatives. For instance, figure 8 below shows that 98.4% of the street vendors are not affiliated with any representative organisation. The implication of this data is that street vendors in Malawi cannot voice their concerns through a representative body.




Figure 8: Percentage of street vendors affiliated to representative organisations

The study asked key informants whether they believe street vendors can relocate to formal markets. One key informant stated that:

It can be done with enough consultations with the community of street vendors. However, street vendors are illegitimate and do not have

representatives. For instance, there is the Lilongwe urban vendors association that represents the general group of vendors in Lilongwe. However, there is no specific representative organisation for street vendors.

The point raised by the key informant agrees with Ndhlovu (2011) survey findings. She argued that street vendors in Lusaka are generally not satisfied with relocation because they do not influence the decisions made by the government. The street vendors lack a collective voice that can be able to negotiate with government concerning their relocation options. Similarly, Chinsinga and Kayuni (2011) argued that the lack of consultation of street vendors was one of the reasons why relocation was problematic in Malawi. Hence, the lack of street vendors' representation is a challenge to relocation efforts. The government cannot be able to improve the formal markets when it does not incorporate the views of street vendors. Street vendors are more likely to dislike formal markets when their opinions on the construction of markets are not considered. According to the voluntarist theory, formalising street vending can only be effective when the formal markets are attractive to street vendors. Hence, the LCC does not effectively implement the relocation policy because no representative organisation speaks on behalf of street vendors, which means that they fail to argue for acceptable formal markets.

4.4 Exploring street vendors' views and reactions towards the relocation policy

Street vendors' relocation is a common problem amongst many cities across the world. Governments find it justified to relocate street vendors when they provide trading alternatives. The strategies used to relocate the street vendors are usually similar, whereby the vendors are removed from the streets by force. For instance, Roever and Skinner (2016) observed that forceful relocations tend to occur in cities in the Global South. However, no attention was given to street vendors' needs and values during the relocation in some examples, including Kampala (Young, 2017), Lusaka (Nchito, 2011; Ndhlovu, 2011), and Malawi (Kayuni and Tambulasi, 2009). However, street vendors' views can determine whether the government's efforts of relocation will be successful.

The FGDs showed that the participants were aware of the illegality of street vending and that they are supposed to operate from formal markets. Similarly, data analysis of

the administered questionnaires revealed that 89% of street vendors were aware of the illegality of street vending. Nonetheless, street vendors are often those who are unable to get jobs in the remunerative formal sector because of their low level of education and skills (Hanewald, 2015). In view of the dualist theory, individuals resort to informal employment, including street vending, because the formal sector does not create enough jobs (Hart, 1973), and they want to defend their right to earn a living. The Constitution of Malawi allows every person to pursue a livelihood anywhere within the national territory. Hence, despite their awareness of the illegality of street vending, 74% of the street vendors return to the same location after evictions, 21% find a new site to sell from, and only 5% stop street vending. According to this data, most street vendors do not conform to the relocation policy. Therefore, this subsection discusses street vendors' views and reactions towards the relocation policy.

4.4.1 Street vendors' views on relocation

People engage in street vending for various reasons. However, the study asked street vendors what motivates them to continue operating illegally despite the government efforts of relocating them (see figure 9 below).




Figure 9: Street vendors' motivations for operating illegally

The survey data in figure 9 shows that most of the street vendors' responses were that they continue to operate illegally due to the unavailability of alternatives. 15.3% of the responses were that they could not find waged jobs, and 45.6% were that they need

money to survive. This data confirms the dualist theory because it shows that street vending is mostly a result of lack of alternatives and individuals just want to survive. Only a few individuals engage in street vending by choice as figure 9 shows that 8.6% of street vendors choose to operate illegally because they consider it as a better opportunity. A common explanation for street vending among several authors is the scarcity of formal employment (Bhowmik, 2005; Forkuor et al., 2017; Mahzambe, 2017). The study has already shown that 79% of the street vendors rely solely on street vending. Street vending is one of the easiest means of earning a livelihood because it requires minor financial input and skills. This explains why individuals with little or no formal education can engage in the business. The lack of alternative options also transpired in the FDGs as one of the reasons for operating illegally. In one instance, FGD participants argued they do not have other means of earning a living because ‘farming is not profitable. Hence, street vending is the only viable option.’ This is in line with Mazhambe’s (2017) findings that show the contribution of street vending to the Zimbabwe economy. Mazhambe concludes that street vending plays an essential role as a coping mechanism for low-income households. Therefore, relocation is opposed because street vendors cannot do otherwise but continue to make a living.

However, the voluntarist theory also explains some of the street vendors’ motivations for operating illegally. The data in figure 9 shows that some individuals consider street vending as an opportunity to make more profits (8.6%) and to avoid paying rent (2.6%). It implies that some of the street vendors made a rational choice to continue operating roadside after seeing the benefits of it. Similarly, the voluntarist theory views street vending as a deliberate choice to enjoy the benefits of informality (Maloney, 2004). Hence, the findings in figure 9 show that there are various motivations for street vending. The voluntarist theory explains this as the choice to operate informally, or even criminally, after weighing the costs and benefits of informality relative to formality.

Together, the dualist and the voluntarist theories imply that various motivations drive street vendors. Despite the already mentioned reasons for operating roadside, the study found that the common element among the street vendors was that they do not agree with the relocation policy. The street vendors in all the FDGs argued that they could

not agree with the relocation policy. They argued that formal markets do not have space to accommodate them, and they do not have alternatives.

Nonetheless, the FGDs revealed that some street vendors would like to relocate to formal markets while others prefer to operate roadside. On the one hand, both FGDs with mobile street vendors revealed that relocation is not viable for them because their business requires flexibility by walking around and searching for customers. Flexibility cannot be exercised in formal markets. Furthermore, street vending is the only viable option because there is too much competition in formal markets. On the other hand, both FGDs with fixed street vendors revealed that they would relocate to formal markets given enough space and less competition. Currently, the LCC has not provided them with enough space; hence, they cannot agree with relocation. Therefore, the voluntarist theory plays a role in understanding why street vendors choose informality. As mentioned in the theoretical framework for this study, street vendors make a rational choice to circumvent regulations (Maloney, 2004). Although the mobile street vendors maintain that they would be less willing to relocate, the fixed street vendors would be more willing to relocate as soon as the LCC provides enough space in the formal markets.

A cross-tabulation of variables was done to establish the relationship between the nature of street vendors (mobile and fixed) and whether they would like to operate from formal markets. Hence, the survey data revealed that about half (49%) of the mobile street vendors and a third (33%) of the fixed street vendors do not wish to relocate to formal markets. This data implies that fixed street vendors are more willing to relocate than mobile street vendors are. The varying views towards relocation support Wongtada's (2014) claim that different types of street vendors are likely to have various challenges. Due to the risk of confiscations during evictions, street vending favours mobile street vendors because they can easily escape the authorities (Steel et al., 2014). Hence, this is one possible explanation for the willingness of the fixed street vendors to relocate to formal markets. The street vendors in Lilongwe operate while in fear of encountering local authorities; hence, they need to be in a position to escape to them. The mobile street vendors have better chances of escaping the local authorities because they carry a lesser load than fixed vendors do.

The survey sought to find out the reasons why some street vendors would like to operate from formal markets while others do not (see figure 10 below).




Figure 10: Cross-tabulation of wish to operate in formal markets and explanations

Out of all the street vendors that would like to operate under formal markets, 80% mentioned that they want stable environments, free from local authorities, and evictions. About 18% indicated that formal markets are well-established, well known by many people and subsequently, attract more customers. On the contrary, 45% of the street vendors that prefer operating roadside mentioned that it is difficult to access to customers in formal markets. About 36% of street vendors prefer operating roadside since formal markets are overcrowded and have high competition. Although some street vendors would like to work under formal markets, others prefer operating along the roads. The voluntarist theory relates to the findings presented in figure 10 because some street vendors prefer operating roadside after evaluating that they cannot have access to as many customers in formal markets. Likewise, the voluntarist theory applies to street vendors who would like to operate under formal markets because they choose the optimal degree of operating formally (Maloney, 2004). They choose formality after evaluating that the formal markets are more stable and can attract more customers.

Therefore, relocating to formal markets is only possible for street vendors when the benefits of formality are higher than the costs. The lack of benefits or incentives in the formal markets results in more street vendors operating roadside.

4.4.2 Street vendors' reactions towards relocation

The study also wanted to find out how street vendors react to the relocation policy. The key informants acknowledged that street vendors had found ways to adapt. For instance, one key informant stated that:

Street vendors have formed relationships with the town rangers. The town rangers send messages to street vendors to warn them of their operations. Street vendors also ply their trade, knowing that they can escape the town rangers and later on return when the authorities are gone.

The FGDs also revealed that street vendors are always on the lookout of city council officials. They receive tips from other vendors, customers, and council officials on the whereabouts of the city patrol. Therefore, the FGDs confirm that street vendors have found ways to adapt to the relocation efforts. In addition, this study found that evictions and confiscations do not convince most (73.6%) of the street vendors to relocate. Figure 11 below shows that the most cited reason for not being persuaded to relocate is that street vending is their only source of income. Therefore, confiscations and evictions cannot convince most street vendors because it is their only way to earn a living. These findings agree with Handoyo and Setiawan (2018), who stated that individuals whose lives depend solely on the job continue to operate as street vendors even if it means working against the law. The findings also agree with Cross' (2000) view that street vending always survives, and it can withstand attempts to eliminate it. Hence, street vendors challenge relocation efforts because they want to defend their right to earn a living. Therefore, this study found that most street vendors continue to operate illegally. Street vending is the only way to make a living for most of them, and the evictions do not convince them to relocate.




Figure 11: Explanations for not being convinced to relocate

Figure 11 also shows that street vendors have learnt to adapt to the relocation efforts. For instance, 6% mentioned that they are used to the situation, 13% search for capital when their goods are confiscated, and 3% formed ties with local authorities. Hence, despite relocation efforts, street vendors find means to adapt to the situation and continue street vending. Similarly, Spire and Choplin (2018) observed that municipal agents in Accra regularly circulate the town. However, their presence does not signify the end of street vending, but rather, the setting up of new rules of behaviour between street vendors and local officials. Street vendors find ways to interact with local officials, whether verbally or through bribes (Spire and Choplin, 2018). Hence, street vendors adapt to relocation efforts, and that explains why they return to the streets at some point.

4.5 Conclusion

The street vending relocation policy aims to stop street vending and move street vendors to formal markets. The implementation of the policy is mainly a responsibility of the local government. In an attempt to relocate street vendors to formal markets, the LCC uses a city patrol to chase and arrest street vendors, and confiscate their goods. However, this approach has been marred with ineffectiveness because, firstly, the LCC fails to implement the policy consistently. Political interference and the unavailability

of resources disrupts the implementation of the policy. Secondly, the relocation fails to meet street vendors' needs and expectations due to the lack of infrastructure and the lack of street vendors' representation. The LCC fails to provide adequate infrastructure that can absorb the growing number of street vendors. The lack of street vendors' representation also negatively affects the LCC's implementation of the policy because they fail to understand and respond to street vendors' needs effectively.

The common view among street vendors is that they do not agree with the relocation policy, and hence they do not comply with it. Some street vendors are survivalists while others are opportunists. The survivalists have no choice but to engage street vending in order to earn a living. At the same time, opportunists make a rational choice to operate as formal market traders or as street vendors depending on the offers available in either location. However, most street vendors fail to find other means of earning a living, and thus have no choice but to engage in street vending. Any bid to stop street vending is a threat to their livelihood. Therefore, confiscations and evictions do not convince most street vendors to relocate because it is their only way for survival in the midst of poverty and the lack of jobs.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

The study focused on analysing the effectiveness of the street vending relocation policy in Malawi. To fulfil this objective, it examined the extent to which the LCC effectively implements the relocation policy and it explored street vendors' views and reactions towards the relocation policy. The study used a mixed methods approach (qualitative and quantitative) in the collection and analysis of data to address the objectives of the study. It collected primary data using semi-structured interviews with three key informants, four FGDs with street vendors, and 384 questionnaires administered to street vendors. It also used secondary data from the review of media reports and journal articles relating to the topic under study. This chapter presents the conclusions of the study, its implications, and recommendations regarding policy and practice, and areas for subsequent research.

5.2 Conclusions

The government policy towards street vending is to ensure that no one establishes a street vending business without obtaining a permit and illegal street vendors are relocated to formal markets. However, the study reveals that the street vending relocation policy is not effective. The study recognised that street vending in Lilongwe is on the rise. The LCC uses a city patrol to relocate street vendors, but their strategy has not been effective. The LCC lacks self-governing power and resources for implementing the policy, and it does not offer alternatives to street vendors after evicting them. Street vendors do not see the benefit of operating in the formal markets. Through the analysis of the implementation of the relocation policy and street vendors' views towards it, the study has established several factors that affect its effectiveness.

The study has shown that the street vending relocation policy is ineffective because of the LCC's inability to limit street vending. The study found that the LCC's work is subject to political interference, which is often a setback to the relocation policy because it weakens local authorities' powers to make decisions on street vending independently. The LCC tends to tolerate street vending during election periods and only take action on the street vending problem when ordered by the central government. Street vendors take advantage of this by maximising the opportunity to remain on the streets. However, the relocations are a deliberate action to repress informal trading and encourage street vendors to operate in formal markets. The relocation policy aims to limit the number of street vendors by removing all the illegal vendors from the streets. Hence, political interference hinders the effectiveness of the relocation policy as the LCC neglects the enforcement of the policy to satisfy politicians' interests. Street vendors use the inconsistency and weakness of the LCC's policy implementation as an opportunity to continue operating illegally.

Apart from political interference, there has also been inconsistency in the implementation of the relocation policy due to the LCC's lack of resources. For instance, the LCC has inadequate vehicles and human resources for the task, and they lack funds to sustain their operations. The lack of resources indicates that the authorities are not always ready to go out to the streets to enforce the law. Hence, the lack of essential resources limits the consistency of policy implementation by the LCC.

The street vending relocation policy aims to move street vendors to formal markets. However, the relocation of street vendors is ineffective due to inadequate formal market infrastructure. The LCC does not provide adequate infrastructure or spaces for vending, and this poses a challenge to relocation because the street vendors do not have alternatives. Street vendors find it justified to remain on the streets because it is their only way to earn a living. The failure to provide street vendors with alternatives means that they will stick to operating illegally.

In addition, effectively implementing the relocation policy requires engaging with street vendors' representatives to understand their needs and expectations. However, the study found that street vendors lack representation. The lack of street vendors' representation poses a challenge to the effectiveness of the policy because the

government implements it without consulting the individuals it directly affects. Street vendors are likely to refuse to comply to the relocation policy when it does not meet their expectations. The street vending relocation policy is implemented without consulting the street vendors. Hence, it cannot be able to meet street vendors' expectations when it does not incorporate their views.

Coming to the question on how street vendors view and react to the relocation policy, the study found that most of the street vendors rely solely on the street vending for survival and cannot do otherwise but continue to earn a living. The study established that there are two types of street vendors, fixed and mobile. Most of the mobile street vendors are less willing to relocate, and yet the government treats street vendors as a homogenous group by forcing all of them to relocate to formal markets. Hence, some street vendors do not agree with the relocation policy because operating informally has more benefits than operating formally. Although street vendors react to the relocation differently, most of them have learnt to adapt to evictions and confiscations, and they remain on the streets despite the implementation of the policy.

5.3 Implications

This study contributes to the literature on the formalisation of the informal sector. Although the literature reviewed in this study broadly discusses the formalisation of informal activities, it does not clearly state how each informal activity could be formalised. There are several informal activities in the global informal economy, including domestic work, waste picking, and street vending, just to mention a few. The formalisation of each of these informal activities would have different meanings and implications for the various informal workers. Therefore, research concerning their formalisation should be conducted separately to understand the specifics surrounding each informal activity. Hence, this study contributes to the knowledge of the formalisation of street vendors in the context of developing countries.

Apart from the implications to literature, the study contributes towards policy concerning the formalisation of street vending. The study found that street vending is driven by, firstly, the urge to survive in the face of increasing poverty and lack of jobs. Secondly, it is driven by the choice to operate informally because of the benefits associated with it. Both the voluntarist and the dualist theories validly explain what

drives street vending. The dualist theory argues that the lack of jobs or alternative survival opportunities drives street vending. Hence, formalisation policies that aim to provide other job opportunities can limit street vending. Whereas, the voluntarist theory states that street vending is a result of entrepreneurs' choices of operating informally. The voluntarist theory argues for formalisation policies that repress street vending and make the formal regulatory environment attractive to absorb street vendors. Given that both causal theories are valid, it implies that no single causal theory is self sufficient to explain street vending and come up with policies that can formalise it. It follows that no single policy prescription provided by the two theories can address the problem of the government failing to formalise street vending. Therefore, formalising street vending requires a comprehensive policy that addresses the drivers of its informality.

In terms of practice, the study makes significant contributions on how the government can come up with effective strategies for relocating street vendors. The study highlights the relationship between street vending and formal regulations. It has shown why the government fails to relocate street vendors to formal markets. Despite having the responsibility of implementing the relocation policy, the LCC lacks autonomous power and resources to implement the policy effectively. The failure of the LCC to implement the relocation policy effectively has led to the rise of street vending. Therefore, the study shows the importance of giving self-governing power and resources to the authorities in order to implement the policy effectively.

Furthermore, the study makes practical contributions because it provides insight on the importance of understanding the views of street vendors to come up with effective policy implementation strategies. Formalisation is not desirable for all individuals in the informal sector. The study has established that some individuals would opt to operate in formal markets, while others would opt to continue operating informally. Specifically, mobile street vendors and fixed street vendors have various reasons for operating informally. Hence, effectively formalising street vending would mean taking different approaches for mobile and fixed street vendors. The study found that mobile street vendors are less likely to prefer operating in formal markets. Therefore, instead of treating street vendors as a homogenous group, the government can revisit the street vending laws to accommodate vendors who prefer operating roadside. For instance, the government could demarcate areas that can allow the operation of street vendors. The

policies that accommodate both mobile and fixed street vendors can increase the number of vendors operating within the legal framework

Lastly, the study shows that most of the street vendors are in the informal sector because they do not have other means of earning a living. It implies that as long as street vendors do not have other jobs, they will continue to operate informally. Hence, there will continue to be new entrants in the informal sector when the formal sector does not provide job opportunities. Therefore, it is of practical relevance for the government to understand the importance of creating more jobs to expand the formal sector and to limit the informal sector.

5.4 Recommendations

The study has shown that the street vending relocation policy is not effective. The LCC fails to contain street vending, and the number of street vendors continues to rise. Guided by the voluntarist theory, formalising street vending can be effective when, firstly, the government takes competent strategies to repress the informal sector. The LCC has not been consistent in repressing street vending due to political interference, lack of resources. Nonetheless, the implementation of the relocation policy is one of the ways of repressing street vending. Hence, the government needs to be consistent in the implementation of the relocation policy. It would require providing local councils with the power and resources necessary to execute their operations in law enforcement.

Secondly, formalising street vending can be effective when street vendors receive the benefits of formality that outweigh those of operating informally. Some street vendors do not see the benefits of operating in formal markets. In view of the voluntarist theory, street vendors can opt to operate formally when the formal markets are more attractive than operating on the streets. The study has shown that the LCC fails to relocate street vendors due to the lack of infrastructure and the failure to respond to vendors' needs. Hence, the government needs to provide attractive market infrastructure to street vendors. The markets can attract street vendors when they conform to their needs. The government can also encourage the formation of street vendors' organisations and engage in consultations with street vendors to understand their actual needs and respond accordingly. The formalisation of street vending would be more effective if it addressed

street vendors' needs heterogeneously and accommodated both mobile and fixed street vendors.

Based on the study findings, the growth of street vending is because most street vendors do not have other means of earning a living. Guided by the dualist theory, informality is a growing phenomenon and it is here to stay. Hence, the government should acknowledge that street vending is largely caused by the lack of formal opportunities for earning income. Therefore, it could limit the growth of street vending by promoting other means of earning a living, including formal ones.

This study focused on analysing the effectiveness of the street vending relocation policy and it collected data from local council authorities and street vendors. The relocation policy aims to move street vendors to formal markets. However, formal market traders, who comply with the relocation policy, were not included in the study population. It would be interesting for future research to examine the experiences of vendors who operate under the formal regulatory environment. The experiences of formal market traders can reveal costs and benefits of operating under the formal regulatory environment, which can have important policy implications of how to entice more individuals to operate in formal markets.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Questionnaire for street vendors

1. Age:
2. Sex:
3. a. Marital status: 1. (Single) 2. (Married) 3. (Divorced) 4. (Widow)
b. Family size:
4. Employment type: 1. (Self-employed). 2. (Wage-employed).
5. Nature of street vendor: 1. (Fixed). 2. (Mobile/Pushcart)
7. Type of goods:
8. Level of education: 1). No schooling 2). Primary school. 3) Secondary. 4) College/ University. 5. Others, specify_____
9. Do you have other sources of income apart from street vending? (*Name the source*)
10. What are the main reasons that made you choose the street vending business? (*Multiple response*)
a) Ancestral/family tradition. b) Loss of agriculture c) Easy means of setting oneself up/low initial invest .d) Flexibility in working .f) Lack of competition/free entry. h). Difficulty to find other salaried job. i) For survival
12. Are you aware that street vending is illegal by law? 1. (Yes) 2. (No)
13. What motivates you to operate on the streets even after the ban by government? (*Multiple response*)
1. Need money for survival. 2. Cannot find an office job. 3. Need flexibility
4. No space in flea markets. 5. Common practice among my community/family
6. Entrepreneurship/ better opportunity 7. Others, specify_____
14. a. Do you expect the prevalence of street vending in Lilongwe?
1. (Yes). 2. (No)
b. *explain response*

15. a. Would you like to operate from the flea market? 1. Yes. 2. No
b. Why?

16. What do you do when the authorities evict you from the streets?
1. Find new location. 2. Return to same location. 3. Stop vending. 4.
Other. _____

17. Have you been chased/evicted by local authorities in the past 12 months?
1. Yes 2. No

18. If yes, how many times have you been chased from your street vending location in the past 6 months?

19. Have your goods been confiscated by local authorities in the past 12 months?
1. Yes 2. No

20. If yes, do the confiscations convince you to relocate to formal markets?
1. Yes. 2. No.
If no, why?

21. How do you rate the prevalence of street vending compared to two years ago?
(Tick)
Prevalence Low Medium High No difference
of Street
vending

22. Do you think street vending is being contained now compared to two years ago?

Yes No I don't know

Give reason for your answer.

24. Are you affiliated to any vendors' association or representative body?
1. (Yes). 2. (No)
(if yes, provide name)

25. Have you ever been consulted by anyone concerning the relocation policy?
1. Yes 2. No.
26. Do you know anywhere you can voice your concerns concerning relocation?
1. Yes. 2. No
27. How many times have you been chased from your street vending location in the past 6 months?
28. When was the last time you were chased by officials?
29. a. Do you think it is possible to relocate street vendors to flea markets effectively?
1. (Yes). 2. (No)
If no, explain
30. Why do you think relocation efforts have not been successful?
31. a. What is your level of satisfaction with the formal markets?
1. (Satisfied). 2. (Neutral). 3. (Not satisfied). 4. (No response)
explain response

Appendix 2: Interview guide for key informant interviews

Name: _____

Position _____

1. What do you consider as street vending?
2. What is the government policy towards street vending?
3. How do you implement the policy?
4. What are the objectives of each strategy?
5. What are you doing to achieve the objectives or
How do you monitor the progress? What criteria do you use to measure progress?
How often are these activities done?
6. What are the outcomes that you were expecting?
 - a. Is the implementation achieving the expected outcomes?
7. Do you expect the prevalence of street vending in Malawi?
8. Do you think street vendors can be effectively relocated to formal market infrastructure?
9. What has been street vendors' reaction towards the policy?
10. How do you respond to their reaction?
11. What is hindering you from effectively relocating the street vendors?

Appendix 3: Interview guide for focus group discussions

1. What attracts you to engage in street vending?
2. *What is the government rule concerning street vending?*
3. How do you look at this rule? How do you respond to this rule?
4. What motivates you to operate on the streets even after the ban by government?
5. Would you like to operate from a Flea market?
6. How do you respond to government evictions
7. How do you respond to confiscations?
8. Do you expect the prevalence of street vending in Malawi?
9. Do you think street vendors can be effectively relocated to formal market infrastructure?
10. What do you do when you are chased and your goods confiscated?
 - a. When was the last time you were chased?
11. Do you think street vending is being contained now compared to two years ago?
12. Why do you think relocation efforts have not been successful?

Appendix 4: Letter of introduction



Principal
Prof. Richard Tambulasi, BA (Pub Admin), BPA (Hons), MPA, Ph.D
Our Ref: PA/1/1
Your Ref:

CHANCELLOR COLLEGE
P.O. Box 280, Zomba, Malawi
Telephone: (265) 01524 222
Fax: (265) 01524 046
Email: principal@cc.ac.mw

Department of Political and Administrative Studies

25th July, 2018

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

Dear Sir/Madam,

LETTER OF INTRODUCTION: MR. MAPOPA MOYO (MA/PAM/16/17)

The bearer of this letter is Mr. Mapopa Moyo. He is a student in Master of Public Administration and Management programme in the Department of Political and Administrative Studies at Chancellor College.

Our students are required to write a dissertation in order to complete their master's programme. Therefore, Mr. Mapopa Moyo intends to carry out a data gathering exercise for this purpose in your office.

Any assistance rendered to him in the course of this exercise will be highly appreciated. Let me also point out that the information gathered will be treated as confidential and purely for academic purposes.

Yours faithfully,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'H. Kayuni'.

Associate Prof. Happy M. Kayuni, PhD
HEAD OF DEPARTMENT

HMK/ck



Appendix 5: Permission to conduct the study

LILONGWE CITY COUNCIL



ALL CORRESPONDENCE TO BE ADDRESSED TO THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

Our Ref: LCC/ ADMIN/7

P.O Box 30396
Lilongwe 3
Malawi
Tel: (265) 773 144
Fax: 01 770 885

9th December, 2019

Mr. Mapopa Moyo
C/O Mrs. C Lowole
PO Box 30658
Lilongwe

Dear Mr. Mapopa Moyo

RE: REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO CONDUCT A RESEARCH IN THE CITY OF LILONGWE

We acknowledge receipt of your letter, dated 6th December 2019 requesting permission to conduct a research in the city of Lilongwe in partial fulfillment towards the award of a Masters Degree in Public Administration and Management.

We wish to inform you that permission has been granted and you can proceed with your planned program, and in any case, conform to research ethics in the course of your data collection.

Kindly note that this approval is granted on condition that your findings will be used for your research purposes only.

Yours faithfully

John Chome
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER